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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1991, Victoria A. Stewart sued her former employer, the law firm of 
Jackson & Nash, claiming that it negligently misrepresented itself and 
fraudulently induced her to join the firm. Stewart claimed that she joined 
Jackson ·& Nash after being told that the firm had been hired by a major client 
for assistance with environmental law issues and that she would manage the 
firm's environmental law department. When no environmental work appeared, 
she was then, she stated, put to work on general litigation matters. According 
to Stewart's complaint, her "'career objective-continuing to specialize in 
environmental law-was thwarted and grossly undermined during her 
employment with Jackson. '" 1 As a result, Stewart claimed damages to her 
professional reputation, a loss of professional opportunities and "damage to 
her 'career growth and potential. '"2 On appeal from an order dismissing the 
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 
Stewart's claim of fraudulent inducement survived a motion to dismiss and 
remanded for trial Stewart' s claim that her career as a lawyer was harmed 
when the firm failed to develop her expertise in environmental law. 3 
Stewart's claim is indirectly supported in a recent article by David Stevens 
in Barrister, the magazine of the Young Lawyers' Division of the American 
• Professor of Law, St. Mary 's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas . Thanks to 
Jim Ely for his suggestions . This article was supported by a generous grant from the Center for 
Law, the Legal Profession and Public Policy . 
1. Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'g in part and rev'g in 
part 778 F. Supp. 790 (S .D.N. Y. 1991) (quoting Count I of Stewart's complaint) . 
2. Id. (quoting Count I of Stewart 's complaint). 
3. ld. at 90. 
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Bar Association. Stevens wrote, "In law, you gotta have a specialty. "4 
Specialization, according to Stevens, is "an essential investment is [sic] your 
future. "5 Stevens quoted an unnamed partner practicing in Los Angeles: 
" 'Look, we need associates who are good generalists, .. . but we make 
partners [those] who are marketable specialists. ' "6 
In another indication of the importance of specialization for lawyers, a 
name partner at a large Dallas law flrm, discussing the future of corporate 
legal work, was quoted as saying, "The traditional law flrm model will be 
reserved for very sophisticated providers of very specialized services, so 
specialized that they can't be done in-house. "7 Simon Rifkind has declared 
specialization the greatest change in the legal profession during his sixty years 
as a lawyer, 8 and a recent report of the American Bar Association's Task 
Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap concluded, "[l]t 
has become increasingly clear that every lawyer is obliged as a practical matter 
to limit the subjects on which he or she will keep abreast and develop particu-
lar competence. "9 
Lawyers today commonly make claims of specialization. 10 Part of the 
4. David Stevens, Are You Partnership Material?, BARRISTER, Fall 1992, at 14, 15. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 15-16. 
7 . Bruce Rubenstein, Airlines Demanding Huge Cuts in Legal Fees: Will They Get Cuts in 
Quality, Too ?, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, June 1993, at 1, 36 (quoting William A. Brewer, 110. 
8 . See Simon H . Rifkind, Shift to Specializ.ationBiggestChangeinLaw, N.Y. L.J . , May 23, 
1988, at S36 . Rifkind, a former federal judge, is a name partner in the large New York law firm 
Paul , Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. An indication of the trend toward specialization is 
the existence in the ABA' s Section of Litigation of 25 committees on substantive law. The inside 
back cover of every issue of Litigation lists the committees . 
9 . TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWtNG THE GAP, AMERICAN 
BAR ASS'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL 
CONTtNUUM 42 (1992) [hereinafter, MACCRATE REPORT] (footnote omitted). 
10. The July 1993 issue of Wisconsin Lawyer, for example, contained four professional 
announcements of certification of specialization or induction into specialized legal societies. See 
Personal Mentions, WIS. LAW. , July 1993, at 58 . Other professional announcements in that 
issue, largely announcements of employment changes , usually included statements indicating the 
limitations of the individual's practice. See id. (containing announcements placed by attorneys, 
generally noting that their "practice is limited to," or that they "concentrate in," particular types 
of legal matters) . These announcements, in a state whose supreme court has just recently rejected 
an effort to "certify the certifiers, " suggest a profound change in the profession' s understanding 
of what it means to be a lawyer. 
In early 1992, the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Wisconsin voted 29-4 to request 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to create a State Board of Legal Certification, which would not 
certify lawyers as specialists, but would regulate those agencies that did. Lawyers could use 
approved certifications in advertisements . See Governors Back Proposal for State Board to 
'Certify the Certifiers ', NEWSL. ST. B. WIS. , Apr. 1992, at 1. The proposed rule was published 
in the February 1993 issue of Wisconsin Lawyer. See In the Matter of the Amendment of 
Supreme Court Rules: SCR Chapter 14 Lawyer Specialization, WIS. LAW. , Feb . 1993, at 47 . 
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present claim to professional status in the practice of law is the achievement 
of expertise not in "law" as such, but in particular fields or aspects of law. 
It is the lawyer's expertise in environmental law, bankruptcy, or real estate, 
not the lawyer's degree in law or licensure by the state, that permits the 
lawyer to claim the mantle of professional. As stated in the Macerate Report, 
"changing law and new complexities have put an increasing premium on 
specialization to maintain competence and to keep abreast of subject mat-
ter. " 11 Thus, Victoria Stewart's claim was that Jackson & Nash denied her 
the opportunity to claim true professional status. 
This claim of professional status, of course, often carries with it the 
economic benefits accorded professionals and other experts in modem 
American society. Just as important, however, is that this claim of profession-
al status accords the claimant a more respected position within the legal 
profession. The Wall Street Journal's report of Stewart's case, for example, 
notes with apparent sympathy that Stewart "now practices general insurance 
defense law in California." 12 
It was not always so. The September 1939 issue of The Reader's Digest 
contains a condensed version of Bellamy Partridge's book Country Lawyer. 13 
The book is the story of the life of Samuel Selden Partridge, the author's 
father, a lawyer in a small town in upstate New York during the Gilded Age. 
In praising his father's work, Partridge wrote, "The city lawyer can specialize 
in whatever field he likes. But the country lawyer must be ready to handle 
almost any kind of case that comes along. " 14 
Echoing this romantic perception of the country lawyer was Robert H. 
Jackson, who, before entering President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 
administration and later joining the Supreme Court, practiced law for many 
years in the small city of Jamestown, New York. About the country lawyer, 
Jackson wrote: 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently rejected the proposal. See Supreme Court Rejects 
Specialization Board, Pro Hac Vice Proposals , NEWSL. ST. B. Wis., Aug. 1993, at l. 
On the other hand, at its recent convention, the ABA approved certification programs of 
the American Bankruptcy Board of Certification, the National Board of Trial Advocacy, and the 
Commercial Law League of America . See Ellen J. Pollock, Certification Approved, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 17, 1993, at B2; Small Steps, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 125. 
11. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 40 . The report continued, "Although solo and 
small-firm practice continues predominately to serve individual clients, the lawyers in these 
practice settings, like in all other practice settings , are increasingly becoming 'specialists. '" /d. 
12. See Ellen J . Pollock, Firms Liable for Promises to Employees , WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1992, 
at B1, B6. This strikes me as revealing in two respects : first, it indicates that the firm for which 
she worked was not prestigious enough to mention; second, it indicates that her claim was valid , 
for she now practiced "general insurance defense law," not environmental law. 
13 . See Bellamy Partridge, CountryLaw.yer, in READER'SDIG., Sept. 1939, at 111 (condensed 
version of BELLAMY PARTRIDGE, COUNTRY LAWYER (1939)) . 
14. /d. at 117. 
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He did not specialize, nor did he pick and choose clients. He rarely 
declined service to worthy ones because of inability to pay. Once enlisted 
for a client, he took his obligation seriously. He insisted on complete 
control of the litigation-he was no mere hired hand. . . . The law to him 
was like a religion, and its practice was more than a means of support; it 
was a mission. He was not always popular in his community, but he was 
respected. Unpopular minorities and individuals often found in him their 
only mediator and advocate.1s 
These statements are important for the manner in which the lawyer is 
defined as a professional. Bellamy Partridge defined his father's profes-
sionalism as a lawyer as a consequence of his father's facility with "law," not 
just particular aspects of law. Robert Jackson defined a lawyer's profes-
sionalism as both a thorough knowledge of law and independence from both 
clients and the community in which the lawyer practiced law. The emblematic 
figure of the country lawyer was, of course, Abraham Lincoln. 16 
Country lawyers were not the only ones taking this approach. Shortly 
after World War II, a three-volume history of the large New York City law 
firm known presently as Cravath, Swaine and Moore, authored by name 
partner Robert T. Swaine, was privately published. 17 The firm, famous in 
legal circles for institutionalizing the system of associates hired on salary to 
work solely on firm matters, had been pilloried regularly during the 1930s in 
the progressive press as a "law factory. " 18 Everything that appellation 
15 . Robert H. Jackson, The County-Seat Lawyer, 36 A.B.A. J. 497, 497 (1950) . For more 
on Jackson, see generally EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 
(1958); Philip B. Kurland, Robert H. Jackson , in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2543 (Leon Friedman & Fred 
L. Israel eds ., 1969); 3 MEMORIALS OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 47-172 (Roger F. Jacobs ed ., 1981). 
16. See Charles W. Moores, The Career of a Country Lawyer-Abraham Lincoln, 35 A.B.A. 
REP. 440 (1910) ; William L. Ransom, Abraham Lincoln ... Profession a Lawyer, Address at the 
Annual Dinner of the Peoria Bar Association (Feb. 15, 1936), in 22 A.B.A. J. 155, 156 (1936) 
("He attained professional distinction without leaving the ranks of those who will always be the 
great reservoir of strength and stability for our country and our profession-the country lawyer.") 
When he spoke those words , Ransom was President of the ABA. See id. at 155. 
The Lincoln Legal Papers project, by searching nearly all of the county courthouses in 
Illinois , is in the midst of a thorough reconstruction of Abraham Lincoln's career as a lawyer in 
Illinois . See Joe P. Bean, The Undiscovered (So Far) Lincoln, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
Sept. 30, 1993, at 6-B; Cameron McWhirter, Unveiling the Mystery of Lincoln 's Early Years, 
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 3, 1993, at 1-L. 
17. See ROBERTT. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS: 1819-1947 (1946-
48) . 
18. Ferdinand Lundberg, The Law Factories: Brains of the Status Quo, 179 HARPER'S MAG. 
180, 189 (1939) . Karl Llewellyn earlier expressed the progressive concern with the influence 
of law factories in the legal profession. See K.N. Llewellyn, 31 COLUM. L. REV . 1215, 1217 
(1931) (book review) ("Let this be written large, for senior partners in lawjactories to ponder 
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brought to mind-from meaningless, repetitive work to treating law as a 
business rather than a profession-was anathema to Swaine. Swaine denied 
the charge that the lawyers of the Cravath firm were simply specialists, 19 
quoting at length Carl A. de Gersdorff s Memorial to his deceased partner Paul 
D. Cravath: "'Cravath's organizing genius gradually transformed the firm into 
a cohesive team containing men both with training and experience designed to 
give them a comprehensive view of the problems of the office clients as well 
as specialists highly trained through concentration in particular fields 
'"20 
Throughout American history, lawyers have defined and redefined what 
it means to be a lawyer. 21 These acts of definition have been attempts to 
communicate reasons for extending authority to lawyers in a culture largely 
opposed to simple assertions of status and authority. The his~ory of legal 
specialization is an important part of the modern (post-1870) liistory of the 
legal profession. 
Although American lawyers have rarely defined "professionalism" in 
clear terms, 22 they have relied repeatedly upon two justifications of the idea 
of law as a profession: (1) the acquisition of the particularized knowledge of 
law, and (2) independence from both clients and the market when engaged in 
the practice of law. The history of the legal profession' s treatment of 
specialization is interwoven with the profession' s views of the importance of 
knowledge and independence. In the early 1900s, some prominent members 
of the profession expressed dismay at the changes in the legal profession. 
Several biographies and autobiographies of prominent lawyers of the late 
nineteenth century noted the displacement of the advocate, or trial lawyer, by 
on: Law does not exist for corporation executives alone.") (emphasis added) . 
19. See 1 SWAINE, supra note 17, at 575. 
20 . /d. (quoting Carl A. de Gersdorft) . De Gersdorff's memorial tribute was published in the 
1941 Yearbook of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and can also be found in 
OTro E. KOEGEL, WALTER S. CARTER: COLLECTOR OF YOUNG MASTERS OR THE PROGENITOR 
OF MANY LAW FIRMS app . Vat 379-88 (1953) . 
21 . See SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN 
PROFESSIONS, 1750-1900, at 67-87 , 206-39 (1991) ; JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF 
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 333-75 (1950). See generally DENNIS R. NOLAN, 
READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (1980) . 
22 . See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional 
Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 189-91 (Robert 
L. Nelson et al. eds . , 1992). A brief history of the rise of lawyer professionalism is contained 
in RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 44-48 (1989) . Two books regularly cited by 
historians and sociologists of the legal profession are MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF 
PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ( 1977) and BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE 
OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN 
AMERICA (1976) . 
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the office, or corporate, lawyer at the pinnacle of the profession. 23 Those 
elder members of the profession greatly regretted the passing of the advocate 
from the apex of the profession and the devolution of the practice of law from 
a profession to a business. In their view, the increasing importance of the 
office lawyer was causing a decline in the profession of law because office 
lawyers, particularly office lawyers in large law firms, were no longer 
independent of their clients, but instead were captive employees of their 
clients. The gravest charge made against lawyers was the accusation attributed 
to Jay Gould: "'[B]rains were the cheapest meat in the market.'"24 Those 
more accepting of the change of the work of the elite25 lawyer claimed 
professional status for office lawyers by defending their independence. The 
apologists offered the oft-quoted statement of Elihu Root, for many the 
epitome of the independent corporate lawyer: "'About half the practice of a 
decent lawyer consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools 
and should stop.' "26 
Office lawyers also were criticized for restricting their practices to 
particular substantive areas of law. Unlike the country lawyer, who knew 
"law," the office lawyer knew only certain aspects of the law. The specialist's 
concentration of knowledge affected his status as a professional in two ways: 
first, the specialist's general ignorance prevented him from acting as an 
independent public servant; second, the specialist's lack of general knowledge 
limited his judgment as a lawyer. The very attempt to specialize, then, formed 
the basis for a critique of the office lawyer's lack of professionalism. 
During the 1920s, the large law firm was institutionalized, and the 
corporate lawyer was established as the exemplar of the successful lawyer. A 
backlash against the work of the large-firm lawyer took place during the 
1930s, but this backlash was not accompanied by an attack on the specializa-
tion found in the "law factory." Instead of suggesting a return to the ideal of 
the generalist country lawyer, critics, largely progressive critics, suggested 
ways in which specialization might be used to benefit society rather than the 
interests of corporate clients of large law firms. 
The call in the 1950s for increased professionalism in law included claims 
23 . See sources cited infra note 51. 
24 . George F. Shelton, Law as a Business , 10 YALE L.J . 275, 276 (1901). 
25. By "elite" I mean only lawyers who practiced law in large law firms in major cities . This 
term is not a qualitative judgment of their work . 
26 . 1 PHILIP JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938) (quoting Elihu Root). However, Jessup also 
quoted a client of Root's as saying, "I have had many lawyers who have told me what I cannot 
do; Mr. Root is the only lawyer who tells me how to do what I want to do. " /d. at 185 . ]essup 
interpreted this comment, variously attributed to Thomas Fortune Ryan and William C. Whitney, 
as indicative of Root' s ability to solve complex business problems within the law, not as 
indicative of Root's willingness to bend the law for essentially illegal or immoral purposes . See 
id. at 185-87. 
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of the necessity of legal specialization. At that time, proponents of special-
ization flipped the traditional argument of lawyer professionalism on its head. 
One aspect of this new argument was that the explosive growth in complexity ' 
of law, particularly federal law, ethically (or professionally) required lawyers 
to place limits on their practices. Instead of claiming knowledge of all of law, 
true professionals limited their practices to areas in which they were expert. 
A second aspect of this argument was that particular expertise allowed lawyers 
greater independence from clients. The expertise of legal specialists made 
them authorities in particular fields of law, an authority which allowed them 
to be more than the instruments of their clients' private interests and desires. 
Most of the proponents of this new definition of professionalism were 
academics and large-firm lawyers. Opposing this redefinition of the 
professional was the successor to the country lawyer: the general practitioner. 
General practitioners, like trial lawyers and country lawyers before them, 
retained the earlier notion of professionalism: because professionalism required 
a lawyer's knowledge of law as such, any diminution in the amount of law 
known by lawyers lessened the lawyer's professional standing. 
The largest and most influential institution through which lawyers tried 
to promote the formal recognition of specialization was the American Bar 
Association (ABA). The ABA's initial response to suggestions to acknowledge 
and regulate specialization by lawyers was the classic bureaucratic response: 
during the 1950s and 1960s, the ABA fashioned several committees which 
attempted to craft a proposal allowing state bar associations to recognize 
specialization. With but a slight exception, the proposals of these committees 
failed miserably. In the 1960s, the pressure to permit recognition of 
specialties intensified. The institutional bar continued to state the goals of 
specialization in professional terms, and implied that resistance to formal 
recognition of specialization was based on economic, that is, nonprofessional 
reasons. By the end of the 1970s, the ABA adopted a Model Plan of 
Specialization, and several states, including California and Texas, structured 
specialization plans. By that time, specialization in the practice of law was 
acknowledged as part of the "professionalism" of lawyering. Opposition to 
legal specialization was no longer undertaken by the country lawyer or general 
practitioners, but by those claiming that specialization was an attempt by the 
bar to extract monopolistic prices for legal services. 
Lawyers not part of the elite of the profession first viewed the formal 
acknowledgment of specialization as a way to create even more hierarchical 
divisions within the bar. It was one thing for elite lawyers quietly to 
specialize; it was another for the bar to formally recognize this as an aspect 
of the professionalism of a lawyer. This formal recognition placed general 
practitioners at a competitive disadvantage in relation to elite lawyers and 
undermined their independence from their clients, because the general 
practitioners' claims to knowledge were made more tenuous. 
Formal recognition of legal specialization was largely underway when the 
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Supreme Court decided Bates v. State Bar,21 which constitutionally protected 
the commercial speech of lawyers. The Bates decision had a twofold impact 
on the specialization movement: it both hastened the process of formally 
recognizing specialties and made formal recognition superfluous. Constitution-
al protection of commercial advertising by lawyers displaced the legal 
profession from its claimed position between the state and the marketplace. 
The fear generated by Bates was the regularly recurrent fear within the legal 
profession that the practice of law would devolve from a profession to a 
business. However, Bates also gave advocates of specialization the opportuni-
ty to use the economic threat posed by legal clinics to create acceptance by 
general practitioners of this new understanding of professionalism. The ability 
of general practitioners to advertise themselves to prospective clients as 
specialists in bankruptcy, personal injury law, labor law, consumer litigation, 
or the like, was not only an effective economic weapon against legal clinics, 
but reestablished lawyers' claims to a particular knowledge that made them 
professionals. For lawyers whose clients were largely individuals this claim 
of particularized knowledge also led to a renewed claim of independence from 
the market and, in addition, to a "unity" with specialists in large law ftrms and 
a separation from lawyers practicing in clinics. Finally, because the original 
arguments in the 1950s and 1960s in favor of formal recognition of specialists 
were couched in terms of competent legal service, access to justice, and 
greater benefits to the client, lawyers serving individuals used the same 
arguments to stave off the claims that advertising would lead to the decline of 
the legal profession and that specialization was no more than a form of 
economic rent-seeking. But although Bates hastened the process of formally 
establishing recognized specialties, the Supreme Court's decision in Peel v. 
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission28 has effectively ended 
the process, for the Court's decision effectively negates the power of bar 
associations to regulate claims to specialization. 
. If all this is true, then there has been a transformation in lawyers' 
understanding of the reasons justifying their position in society and, therefore, 
a transformation in their understanding of what it means to be a "profession-
al." Although this transformation has taken place in part for instrumental 
reasons, 29 I will focus in this article on the ideological reasons for this 
transformation. The ideological reasons include: the influence of the ABA in 
27. 433 u.s. 350 (1977) . 
28 . 496 U.S. 91 (1990) . 
29. The instrumental reasons are the usual suspects : the industrialization of the United States; 
the economic value of expertise, or product differentiation; the development and growth of the 
large law firm; the impact of the regulatory state on the practice of law (and the creation of that 
species of lawyer known as the "Washington lawyer"); the increasing proliferation of well-paying 
institutional clients like large corporations; and, recently, the influence of advertising by lawyers 
and the decline of the notion of loyalty between law firm and lawyer. 
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promulgating and proselytizing specialization standards; a continuing insistence 
by the legal profession of the importance of the idea of a unified bar; the large 
increase in size and influence of the legal academy, consisting of persons 
usually "specializing" (as teacher, scholar, or consultant) in no more than a 
few subject areas of law; the American culture's amazing faith in experts, and 
the ever-narrowing refmements of expertise; and, most importantly, a 
continued belief by lawyers in the ideals of "professionalism," an ideal that 
distinguishes the practice of law from business. 
II. THE AUTHORITY OF LAWYERS 
Historians and sociologists of the legal profession tum regularly to de 
Tocqueville to explain why lawyers in America have traditionally been 
accorded such tremendous authority and power in an officially nonhierarchical 
society. De Tocqueville observed that "lawyers ... form the highest political 
class and the most cultivated portion of society. "30 This has, for most of 
American history, 31 reflected the position of lawyers. This authority traced 
itself not only to the belief (or faith, if you will) in law, but to the belief by 
lawyers themselves in the importance of understanding the "'artificial Reason 
and Judgment of Law. '"32 
In his fascinating study of the history of professional authority in the United 
States, 33 Professor Samuel Haber suggested that during the last half of the 
eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth century, lawyers were 
able to claim honor and authority in the practice of law for two reasons: (1) 
a lawyer practicing law treated it as an honored profession rather than a trade; 
and (2) a lawyer understood that practicing law was not simply the application 
of the lawyer's skills or techniques, but a knowledge of the science of law. 34 
Haber's model was James Wilson, signatory to the Constitution, Supreme 
30. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 278 (Henry Reeve trans . & 
Phillips Bradley ed., 1945) (1835) . 
31. The long, dark night of the Jacksonian era eclipsed, for a time, the authority of lawyers 
in American society, and has been a sore spot for apologists of the legal profession. See DEREK 
BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: HOW EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND HOW IT 
AFFECTS AMERICA 27 (1993) ("The years from 1830 to 1870 proved to be the nadir of the legal 
profession."); ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 223-49 
(1953) (calling the period "The Era of Decadence") . But see GERARD W. GAWALT, THE 
PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS 1760-
1840, at 168-97 (1979) (concluding that by 1840, the legal profession in Massachusetts was 
immune from frontal attacks on its authority). 
32. STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMJL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 8 (2d ed . 1989) (quoting Sir Edward Coke's report of his response to King James I's 
claim to supreme authority to interpret the law). 
33. HABER, supra note 21. 
34. See id. at 86. 
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Court Justice, and first lecturer in law at the University of Pennsylvania. For 
Wilson, " [t]he lawyers who practiced law as a profession ... looked to the 
underlying principles o(science, and, secure in these, could range widely and 
boldly in their practice. " 35 
This twofold understanding of the profession of law was also exemplified 
in sentiments offered by two famous antebellum Massachusetts lawyers, Daniel 
Webster and Joseph Story. Webster's biographer, Claude Fuess, quoted a 
letter from Webster dating to the earliest days of his law practice: "'Our 
profession is good if practised in the spirit of it; it is damnable fraud and 
iniquity, when its true spirit is supplied by a spirit of mischief-making and 
money-catching. '"36 As a young man, Joseph Story wrote a friend, "Law I 
admire as a science; it becomes tedious and embarrassing only when it 
degenerates into a trade. "37 
In 1871, in the Preface to his Cases on Contracts, Dean Christopher 
Columbus Langdell connected university-based legal training with the notion 
of law as a science. 38 He repeated that theme in 1886 on the occasion of the 
250th anniversary of the founding of Harvard College: 
[To improve the Harvard Law School, i]t was indispensable to establish at 
least two things: first, that the law is a science; secondly, that all the 
available materials of that science are contained in printed books. If law 
be not a science, a university will best consult its own dignity in declining 
to teach it. If it be not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may 
best be learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practises it. If it 
be a science, it will scarcely be disputed that it is one of the greatest and 
most difficult of sciences. 39 
The idea that law is a science has had a powerful hold on American 
lawyers. 40 Thomas Jefferson wrote that the science of law would be 
35. /d. 
36. 1 CLAUDE M. FUESS, DANIEL WEBSTER 86 (1930) (quoting January 19, 1806 letter of 
Daniel Webster) . Webster later was notorious for his avarice . See James W. Ely, Jr. , Book 
Review, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 246, 248 (1991) (reviewing THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, 
LEGAL PAPERS, VOLUME 3: THE FEDERAL PRACTICE (Andrew J. King ed., 1989)) (quoting 
disgruntled client as saying "Webster, like all the Lawyers, is unreasonable in relation to Money 
Matters ."). 
37. Joseph Story, Letter to Thomas Welch (Oct. 19, 1799), in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF 
JOSEPH STORY 81 , 83 (William W. Story ed., 1851). 
38. See C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871) . 
39. Christopher C. Langdell , Address at the Commemoration of the 250th Anniversary of the 
Founding of Harvard College (Nov. 5, 1886), in A RECORD OF THE COMMEMORATION, 
NOVEMBER FIFTH TO EIGHTH, 1886, ON THE TwO HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF 
THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 85 (1887) . 
40. See generally THE GLADSOME LIGHT OF JURISPRUDENCE (Michael H. Hoefliched., 1988) 
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threatened if it were not protected from lower classes of attomeys.41 In 
1827, Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts from 1830 to 1860, said, "[T]he law is a science founded upon reason 
and principle, and no law can stand the test of strict inquiry which palpably 
violates the dictates of natural justice . . . . "42 George Sharswood, whose 
1854 essay on professional ethics became the primary source for the legal 
profession's 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, wrote: "The American 
lawyer must thus extend his researches into all parts of the science, which has 
for its object human government and law .... "43 In his biography of Joseph 
H. Choate, Theron Strong favorably compared the "court lawyer" to the 
"business lawyer" on the ground that "[t]he business of the Court lawyer calls 
for intellectual capacity of a high order, developed by assiduous study of the 
law as a science, and by literary culture. "44 And in two essays concerning 
the legal thought and practice of elite lawyers from 1870 through the early 
years of the twentieth century, Professor Robert W. Gordon noted the 
recurrent theme of the development of the science of law. 45 
The other pillar of professionalism, independence, was tied to the notion 
of the lawyer as "officer of the court. "46 As an officer of the court, a lawyer 
(collecting speeches from 18th- and 19th-century lawyers which often advert to the idea of Jaw 
as a science). I have discussed the connection between the development of the modern legal 
profession and the belief that Jaw is a science in Michael Ariens, Modem Legal Times: Making 
a Professional Legal Culture, 15 J . AM. CULTURE 25 (1991) . 
41. "I think the bar of the General Court a proper and an excellent nursery for future judges 
if it be so regulated as that science may be encouraged and may live there. But this can never 
be if an inundation of insects is permitted to come from the county courts and consume the 
harvest." Thomas Jefferson, Letter to George Wythe (Mar. 1, 1779), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 166 (PaulL. Forded., 1893), quoted in ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR 
THE PuBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 404 (1921). 
42 . Lemuel Shaw, Profession of the Law in the United States, Address before the Suffolk, 
Mass. Bar (May 1827), in 7 AMER. JURIST AND L. MAG. 56, 68 (1832) . 
43. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 26 (5th ed. 1884), reprinted 
in 32 A.B.A. REP. 26 (1907). 
44. THERON G. STRONG, JOSEPH H. CHOATE 128 (1917). 
45 . The essays are Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of 
American Enterprise, I870-I920 [hereinafter Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice], in 
PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 82-90 (Gerald L. Geison ed ., 1983); 
Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York 
City Lawyers, I870-I9IO [hereinafter Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual], in THE NEW HIGH 
PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 52-57 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) 
[hereinafter THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS). 
46. See JULIUS H. COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 22 (rev. ed. G.A. Jennings 
Co. 1924) (photo. reprint 1979) ("It is because of the lawyer's position as an officer of the court 
that the disciplinary process is made practicable."); ARTHUR H. DEAN, WILLIAM NELSON 
CROMWELL 1854-1948: AN AMERICAN PIONEER IN CORPORATION, COMPARATIVE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (1957) (claiming that William Cromwell, a first-generation office 
lawyer, "never forgot that he was first and foremost an 'officer of the court'"); HABER, supra 
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was under a duty to serve the interests of justice, not just the interests of the 
client. Even though the client paid for the lawyer's service, the lawyer was 
a professional, whose main purpose was "[p]ursuit of the learned art in the 
spirit of a public service. "47 Because the making of money was merely an 
incidental purpose of the legal profession, 48 the lawyer's duty to the cause of 
justice should not and could not be purchased by the client. Once elite legal 
practice shifted from advocacy to office practice, however, the concept of the 
lawyer as an "officer of the court" was stripped of its original meaning. 
Lawyers' claims that their public duties made them independent of their clients 
were no longer available. Coupled with the increasing wealth generated by 
such office lawyers and the firms built around corporate practice, the promi-
nence of the office lawyer threatened the identity of the profession as a 
profession. 
At the same time, however, the increasing complexity of the work 
undertaken by lawyers, particularly office lawyers, created a greater strength 
in the "law as science" concept. 49 Knowledge remained a necessary 
component of being a true professional. However, the professionalism of 
office lawyers was attacked because their narrow expertise robbed them of any 
breadth of judgment. so 
note 21, at 208 (citing, among others, Thomas Cooley); BERYL H. LEVY, CORPORATION 
LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER? 173-74 (1961) (linking the independence of lawyers to the idea of 
the lawyer as "officer of the court"); REED, supra note 41, at 3 ("From their earliest origins the 
law has accorded to these 'officers of the court' certain special and exclusive privileges, which 
set them apart from the mass of the people as truly as if they were, in a strict sense, public offi-
cials ."); SHARSWOOD, supra note 43, at 58 & nn.1-2; id. at 83 ("Now the lawyer is not merely 
the agent of the party; he is an officer of the court."); Alfred Hemenway, The American Lawyer, 
Address at the 1905 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, in 28 A.B.A. REP. 390, 
390 (1905) ("On admission to the Bar each [lawyer] becomes an officer of the court."); William 
L. Ransom, Some Impressions of American Lawyers Today, Address at the 1936 Annual Meeting 
of the American Bar Association, in 22 A.B.A. J. 663, 664 (1936) (commenting as ABA 
President that "[t]he Bar and people are coming to realize that lawyers as well as Courts are a 
vital part of the administration of impartial justice under law; that the lawyers of a State are the 
officers of its Courts and are responsible to its Courts"); An Ancient And Honorable Profession, 
11 MARQ. L. REv. 113, 113 (1927) ("'The law is an ancient and honorable profession. An 
attorney at law is an officer of the court, and an inherent part of our judicial system.'") (quoting 
In re Board of Law Examiners, 210 N.W. 710, 711 (Wis. 1926) (Doerfler, J.)). 
47. POUND, supra note 31, at 5. 
48 . ld.; accord CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 12 (1908) ("In fixing fees it should 
never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere 
money-getting trade."). 
49. See essays cited supra note 45 . 
50. See Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, Address to the Chicago Bar Association (Jan. 
3, 1916), in 10 ILL. L. REv. 461 , 469-70 (1916) ("The growing intensity of professional life 
tended also to discourage participation in public affairs, and thus the broadening of view which 
comes from political life was lost. The deepening of knowledge in certain subjects was purchased 
at the cost of vast areas of ignorance and grave danger of resultant distortion of judgment."); 
Robert H. Jackson, Address to Beaver County Bar Association, Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania(Mar. 
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Ill. A HISTORY OF SPECIALIZATION 
A. The Changing of the Bar: 1870-1900 
1015 
During the last third of the nineteenth century, the work of both elite and 
nonelite lawyers changed markedly. This change apparently precipitated a 
crisis of professionalism among elite lawyers during the flrst decade of the 
twentieth century, a crisis caused in part by a fear of the impact of increased 
lawyer specialization. 
A number of biographies exist of elite lawyers whose practices encom-
passed much of the Gilded Age. 51 These works, written between 1917 and 
1940 and almost exclusively concerned with the practice of law in New York 
City, unanimously agreed that the "great" lawyers before the turn of the 
century were advocates, or in today's parlance, trial lawyers. 52 Underlying 
the authors' extensive recounting of the relationship of the subjects to the great 
events or great people of their times, however, were efforts to recount the lost 
golden age of the legal profession. A wistfulness is evident on the part of the 
authors (and often on the part of the subjects as well) for a type of legal 
30, 1935}, quoted in Eugene C. Gerhart, Organization for the Practice of Law: How Lawyers 
Conduct Their Practice, 37 A.B.A. J. 729, 731 (1951) ("No person who rightly appreciates the 
advantages of the division of labor will deny an important place in an advisory and consultive 
way to the specialist, but his seat is not the seat of judgment. That calls for a breadth of view 
and understanding that may not be so deep as the specialist's, but must be broader."); Shelton, 
supra note 24, at 279 ("Specialization in the Jaw and the devotion of years to a perfection of 
knowledge in one branch, results in only a partially developed man.") . 
51. Some of those biographies are: JOSEPHS. AUERBACH, THE BAR OF 0rHER DAYS (1940) 
{a collection of short biographies) ; CHESTER L. BARROWS, WILLIAM M. EVARTS: LAWYER, 
DIPLOMAT, STATESMAN (1941) ; WILLIAM N. BRIGANCE, JEREMIAH SULLIVAN BLACK: A 
DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TEN COMMANDMENTS (1934); ALEXANDER C. 
FLICK, SAMUEL JONES TILDEN: A STUDY IN POLITICAL SAGACITY {1939); THE AUTOBIOGRAPHI-
CAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (David J. Danelski & JosephS. Tulchin eds., 1973) 
[hereinafter AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES] ; PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT (1938) ; 
and EDWARDS. MARTIN, THE LIFE OF JOSEPH HODGES CHOATE (1920) ; STRONG, supra note 
44; and THERON G. STRONG, LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER'S LIFETIME (1914) . An excellent study 
of prominent lawyers in late-19th-century New York City is contained in GEORGE MARTIN, 
CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE AssOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK, 1870-1970 (1970) [hereinafter GEORGE MARTIN , CAUSES AND CONFLICTS] . 
An autobiography that focuses on a slightly later period is GEORGE W. PEPPER, PHILADELPHIA 
LAWYER (1944) . 
Although these works are more hagiography than biography, they provide helpful insights. 
The most successful portrayals are Jessup 's Elihu Root, a very sympathetic but full discussion of 
Root's work, and Brigance's Jeremiah Sullivan Black, which successfully rescues a figure from 
oblivion. 
52. See, e.g. , BARROWS, supra note 51, at viii (" ' [Evarts's biography] will preserve to 
posterity the portraiture of a great lawyer and advocate of the time before the day of specialists 
when the leaders of the Anerican Bar were great lawyers and advocates '") (quoting George F. 
Hoar). 
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practice no longer undertaken by elite lawyers, and one result was that the 
authors discussed the "great" cases tried by nineteenth-century lawyers in 
great detail . 
For example, the biographers of Joseph Hodges Choate and William M. 
Evarts, long partners in the firm of Evarts, Southmayd and Choate, spent a 
great deal of time regaling the reader with stories of cases tried against or with 
James Coolidge Carter, 53 David Dudley Field, 54 William Curtis Noyes,55 
and Charles O'Conor.56 At some point before the end of the century, the 
authors dejectedly noted, there was a shift in the practice of law from the 
advocate to the "office lawyer. "57 One reason for the unhappiness of the 
biographers was the passing of the individual lawyer from the center of study 
and a turn to the importance of the large law firm. 58 A second reason was 
the perception that this change in the "best" lawyers was a cause of the decline 
in the idea of law as a profession. 
The best example of this change in the practice of law is found in The 
Autobiography of Thomas L. Chadboume.59 Chadbourne began his career 
53. James Coolidge Carter (1827-1905) is best remembered today as a vociferous foe of 
codification efforts led by his rival David Dudley Field. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 403-05 (2d ed. 1985). According to George Martin, Carter "was 
probably the most famous lawyer of the 1890's." GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, 
supra note 51, at 173. Although no full-length biography of Carter exists, a couple of short ones 
are Frederick C. Hicks, James Coolidge Carter, in 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 536 
(Allen Johnson & Dumas Malone eds ., 1943), and George A. Miller, James Coolidge Caner, 
in 8 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 3 (William D. Lewis ed., 1909). 
54. David Dudley Field (1805-94) was the author of the Field Code, New York's Code of 
Civil Procedure, and was an ardent proponent of codification of the laws . See generally HENRY 
M. FIELD, THE LIFE OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (1898); DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 
AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW (1986); Frederick C. Hicks , David Dudley Field, in 6 
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 360 (Allen Johnson& Dumas Malone eds., 1943); Helen 
K. Hoy, David Dudley Field, in 5 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 125 (William D. Lewis ed., 
1908). 
55. According to William Evarts's biographer, William Curtis Noyes (1805-64) was not as 
well known as several other New York lawyers, "but Evarts never opposed a higher type of 
lawyer. " BARROWS, supra note 51, at 59. GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS contains no biography 
of Noyes, but a brief essay on Noyes can be found in Austin L. Moore, William Cunis Noyes, 
in 13 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 592 (Dumas Malone ed ., 1943). 
56. Charles O'Conor (1804-84) was the oldest of these advocates . He always practiced 
without partners, though he used future Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Columbus 
Langdell as an assistant to help prepare cases . See GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, 
supra note 51, at 20 & n.*. No full-length biography of O'Conor exists, but see Henry E. 
Gregory , Charles O'Conor, in 5 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 81 (William D. Lewis ed ., 1908), 
for a short biography of O'Conor. 
57. See, e.g. , GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 51, at 187. 
58. Law firm biographies not cited elsewhere include WILLIAM W. CLARY, HISTORY OF THE 
LAW FIRM OF O'MELVENY AND MYERS: 1885-1965 (1966) and HENRY TAFT, A CENTURY AND 
A HALF AT THE NEW YORK BAR (1938) . 
59. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS L. CHADBOURNE (Charles C. Goetsch & Margaret L. 
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in Chicago as a clerk to former Judge Russell Wing, a trial lawyer. 60 In 
1893, Chadbourne moved to Milwaukee to open his own practice.61 In his 
view, the panic of 1893 "worked a tremendous change in the legal profes-
sion. "62 Chadbourne turned from representing individuals in the trial of civil 
and criminal cases to working in behalf of corporations whose operations were 
affected by laws regulating commerce. Three years later and only twenty-five 
years old, Chadbourne returned to Chicago to practice law with Judge 
Wing. 63 He wrote that he intended to "work a change in Wing's prac-
tice. "64 Although Chadbourne initially accepted criminal and personal injury 
cases brought to the firm, he recalled, "It finally dawned on me that with the 
same thought and energy, we could make much more money by changing our 
practice and making it more corporate and commercial and less trial and 
criminal. "65 At the age of thirty-one, Chadbourne moved to New York City 
and practiced corporate law exclusively. 66 His practice, combined with 
interrelated business ventures, made Chadbourne a multi-millionaire. 
Chadbourne's writing contained none of the wistfulness found in the generation 
of elite lawyers that preceded him. There was only the quest for the deal, and 
for money. 
That a desire for wealth was the reason Chadbourne decided to become 
an office lawyer did not make him exceptional. It is clear, from this distance, 
that the accumulation of wealth was the driving force behind much of the 
migration of the elite of the profession from court work to corporate work. 
First-generation corporate lawyers like William Nelson Cromwell, Francis 
Lynde Stetson and Paul D. Cravath earned enormous fortunes. Another first-
generation office lawyer, John W. Sterling,67 who "never under any circum-
stances appeared in court, "68 made Yale University the residual beneficiary 
of his estate. By the time it was fmally disbursed, the amount received by 
Yale totaled more than $35,000,000.69 Second-generation corporate lawyer 
John W. Davis, who first practiced law in West Virginia in the late nineteenth 
Shivers eds ., 1985). Chadbourne, with the help of journalist George Creel, penned this 
autobiography in 1928, when he was 57. Although he lived for another decade, he never updated 
this autobiography, which he wrote for his young daughters. 
60 . See id. at 20 . 
61. See id. at 27. 
62. ld. at 28 . 
63. See id. at 31. 
64. ld. at 34. 
65 . /d. 
66. See id. at 49. 
67. On Sterling, and the firm he helped found, see generally WALTER K. EARLE, SHEARMAN 
AND STERLING (1973). 
68. GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 51, at 194. 
69. ld.; EARLE, supra note 67, at 188-89. 
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century, moved to New York City in 1921 and enjoyed an average annual 
income of $400,000 before the end of the decade, although this declined to an 
average of $275,000 after the Crash of 1929.70 In the depression year of 
1936, John Foster Dulles of Sullivan and Cromwell earned $377,000.71 
Because a lawyer's independence from both his client and the passions of 
the community was a strongly held justification for treating law as a profession 
rather than a business, the idea that the wealthiest lawyers might be dependent 
upon their clients was an extremely unattractive proposition to many lawyers. 
The fact that many of the wealthiest lawyers were perched atop large pyramids 
of lower-paid lawyers led to some distrust of the large law firm's professional 
ethos. At least two prominent lawyers who benefitted fmancially from this 
transformation of the legal profession, Charles Evans Hughes and Elihu Root, 
clearly attempted to distance themselves from any dependence on the clients 
of the large law firm. 
After Charles Evans Hughes resigned from the Supreme Court and failed 
in his 1916 presidential bid, he returned to the practice of law. His Autobio-
graphical Notes state, "I was especially desirous to have the position of 
independent counsel, "72 resulting in his declining offers to join Guggenheim 
Brothers and Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft before finally deciding to rejoin 
his old law partners as counsel. 73 After serving for four years as Secretary 
of State to Presidents Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, Hughes again 
returned in 1925 to the private practice of law. He later wrote of this time, 
"As in the years before I became Secretary of State, I maintained a position 
of complete independence at the bar, taking cases which I thought should be 
argued, regardless of popular feeling, and refusing those in which for one 
reason or another I did not care to appear. "74 After Elihu Root first entered 
public life, his return, temporarily in 1904-05 and permanently in 1915, to the 
private practice of law did not involve joining a law firm as a partner. Root 
decided not to join his old law firm, but "confined himself to acting as 
70. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Lawyers and Clients in the Twentieth Century, in AMERICAN LAw 
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 353, 355 (LawrenceM. Friedman 
& Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1978). On Davis, see generally WILLIAM E. HARBAUGH, LAWYERS' 
LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS (1973). 
71. NANCY LISAGOR & FRANK LIPSJUS, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE 
LAW FIRM SULLIVAN AND CROMWELL 110 (1988). Due to a new partnership agreement in 
which Dulles agreed to reduce his percentage of firm profits, this amount was actually lower than 
Dulles would otherwise have received . See id. at 109-10. Nearly half of American lawyers 
earned less than $2 ,000 a year at the time. /d. at 109. 
72. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES, supra note 51 , at 186. 
73. /d. at 186 & n.2. 
74. /d. at 285. When Hughes was nominated for the second time to the Supreme Court in 
1930, his nomination was nearly derailed by criticism of his affinity for work for wealthy 
corporations. /d. at 295-97. Hughes has been criticized for attempting to avoid the consequences 
of his choice to work in behalf of large corporations in Auerbach, supra note 70, at 355-56. 
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counsel. "75 
The decisions by Root and Hughes to act as independent counsel rather 
than as partners in law firms may be usefully contrasted with William Evarts's 
decision in the 1880s. After serving as Secretary of State for President 
Rutherford B. Hayes from 1877 to 1881 and representing the United States for 
a short time at the Paris Monetary Conference, Evarts returned at age sixty-
four to his old law firm and the practice of law. These divergent career 
decisions between Hughes and Root, on the one hand, and Evarts, on the 
other, suggest that between the 1880s and 1915 there was not only a 
substantial shift in the practice of law, but also a shift in the relations among 
lawyer, law firm, and client. 
This shift in the practice of law has become part of the story of the rise 
of many oftoday's large law firms. One example is _the New York City law 
firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. The death of sixty-one-year-old Algernon 
Sullivan in December 1889 gave William Cromwell the opportunity to redirect 
the practice of the firm away from the courts, favored by Sullivan, and toward 
office practice, favored by Cromwell.76 The shift in the relations among 
lawyer, law firm, and client was a precipitating cause in creating a crisis of 
professionalism. Although this crisis peaked roughly during the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, it remains with us today. 
The standard story is that the increasing importance of the corporation 
in American economic development, and the legal fees generated by the need 
for corporate counselling, led to two developments: first, the substitution of 
corporate counselling for advocacy as the leading form of the practice of law; 
and second, the creation of the large law firm. 77 Hurst's seminal history of 
American law places these changes in the practice of law in the late nineteenth 
century. 78 Samuel Haber's work dates the rise of the large law firms at the 
75. 1 JESSUP, supra note 26, at 413 . 
76. LISAGOR & LIPSIUS, supra note 71, at 23 . 
77. 
! 
\ 
Around the tum of the century, the professional talents of courtroom advocacy 
and brief-making were referred to again and again as "lost arts," as the occupation 
of the successful lawyer centered more and more upon counseling clients and offering 
business advice. General and versatile talent, less needed than in the old days, was 
replaced by specialized practice and the division of labor within law firms. The firms 
themselves grew larger; the process of concentration and combination in business, 
which limited profitable counseling to fewer and larger firms, engendered a like 
concentration in the law. Metropolitan law firms, as they grew larger and more 
profitable, moved into closer relationships with and became "house counsel" of the 
large investment houses, banks, or industrial firms that provided them with most of 
their business. But the relation that was the source of profit brought with it a loss of 
independence to the great practitioners . 
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 158-59 (1955). 
78. See HURST, supra note 21, at 297-98, 306-07. 
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tum of the century. 79 George Martin's history of the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York, a voluntary bar association of the most prominent 
lawyers in New York, suggests that the changes began about 1890,80 and 
Chadbourne believed that the shift in practice was a consequence of the panic 
of 1893. 81 
Although it should not surprise lawyers that a depression may result in an 
increase in business, the instrumental reason for such an abrupt change can be 
traced to the particular work created by the panic: railroad reorganization. 82 
As noted by Paul D. Cravath nearly a quarter of a century later, the 
reorganization of a railroad's assets and liabilities rarely meant the dissolution 
of the railroad. That is, even during the period of reorganization, the 
continued existence of the railroad was a given, unlike the case in which a 
manufacturing company was reorganized. 83 Reorganization counsel, then, 
were given the opportunity to meet and impress future clients with their work 
reorganizing railroads. Chadbourne's autobiography makes clear that the 
reorganization lawyer's work was quite lucrative. These instrumental reasons, 
79. See HABER, supra note 21, at 232-33. 
80. GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 51, at 187. At least one 
commentator of the time agreed, observing: "Litigation has declined, and counsel work has 
become the leading feature of practice. The chief forum of the lawyer has been transferred from 
the court house to the office." The Decline of Litigation, 1 AM. LAW. 5, 5 (1893) quoted in 
MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PuBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 
350 (1977). 
81 . See THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS CHADBOURNE, supra note 59, at 28; accord Robert 
T. Swaine, Impact of Big Business on the Profession: An Answer to Critics of the Modem Bar, 
35 A.B.A. J. 89, 89, 91 (1949) (noting that "during the 1880's and 1890's, many leading 
advocates of New York, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago were devoting an increasing part of 
their practice to office work") . Walter Earle, partner in and historian of the law firm of 
Shearman & Sterling, suggested that the change in the practice of law began in 1873 with the 
advent of the industrialization of the United States . EARLE, supra note 67, at 28-29. Of course, 
that was also the year in which the firm of Shearman & Sterling was founded. /d. at 23. David 
Dudley Field's biographer Daun van Ee also suggested that ihe change in the practice of law 
occurred about 1870. VAN EE, supra note 54, at 218-19,290. It was around this time that Field 
represented Jim Fisk and Jay Gould in the infamous Erie Railroad takeover battles. See id. at 
221-31. 
82. With a great deal of clarity, Professor Robert Gordon has explained the impact of railroad 
reorganization work on the practice of elite lawyers . See Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal 
Practice, supra note 45, at 101-09. An early criticism of the inefficiency of railroad 
reorganization, and the role played by lawyers in fostering this inefficiency is SAMUEL 
UNTERMYER, THE LAWYER-CITIZEN-HIS ENLARGING RESPONSffiiLITIES 15-24 (1916) (address 
at the July 27, 1916 meeting of the Commercial Law League). 
83. Paul D. Cravath, The Reorganization of Corporations; Bondholders' and Stockholders' 
Protective Committees; Reorganization Committees; and the Voluntary Recapitalization of 
Corporations, Lecture Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Mar. 1 & 8, 
1916), in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 
153, 211-12 (1917). 
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in my view, helped change the practice of the elite lawyer. 
But there was also another reason: the growth of law schools and law 
graduates. From 1870, when Langdell arrived at Harvard Law School, to 
1890, the number of law schools nearly doubled, from thirty-one to sixty-
one. 84 By 1910, the number of law schools had more than doubled again, to 
124.85 The number of law students enrolled in law schools increased from 
1,653 in 1870 to 19,567 by 1910.86 This massive rise in the number of law 
students, as demonstrated by Jerold Auerbach, 87 included a large number of 
post-Civil War immigrants, particularly Jews and Catholics whose parents (or 
who themselves) had emigrated from southern and eastern Europe. 
At the same time that office practice became particularly lucrative, the 
number of lawyers increased dramatically, particularly in New York City, 
where elite lawyers were concentrated. The professional ethos would not 
permit elite lawyers to justify the shift in the practice of law solely for the 
reason that office practice paid better. 88 Instead, the argument for corporate 
practice as the leading form of practice was made for reasons of knowledge. 
Trial work came to be seen as beneath the level of professional complexity 
involved in corporate counselling. Elite corporate lawyers and their successors 
justified the transition on the basis that more knowledge of law was involved 
in corporate counselling than in trial work. Most trial lawyers were 
"unprofessional," relying on their relationships with judges (a nod to the 
history of judicial corruption in New York) and obtaining work by peddling 
their licenses to "practice" law. Lurking behind this professional excuse was 
a class-based justification to separate office from trial lawyers. There were, 
then, ideological justifications for the shift. 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, however, some elite 
lawyers trained in the art of advocacy refused to accept this portrayal of the 
court lawyer. Instead of accepting as a given the greater legal complexity of 
corporate practice as compared with advocacy, these older elite lawyers 
contended that the art of advocacy was more difficult than office practice. 89 
84. WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
SOCIETY, 1890-1930 at 108 tbl. 1 (1986) . 
85. /d. 
86. /d. 
87. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERICA 50, 119-29 (1976) . 
88. Walter Earle's history of Shearman & Sterling allows that one of the reasons for the firm's 
tum to corporation law was monetary, but this reason was listed as the last of three reasons. 
EARLE, supra note 67, at 36 ("Besides, corporation law was becoming more interesting, more 
important, and more remunerative.") . Even after World War II, apologists for the large law firm 
downplayed the relationship between wealth and the practice of law in a large law firm. See 
DEAN, supra note 46, at 86-87; LEVY, supra note 46, at 166-69; HARRISON TwEED, THE 
CHANGING PRACTICE OF LAW 10 (1955). 
89. 
The successful lawyer is, at present, viewed from the standpoint of commercial 
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It was not until the 1920s that office practice came to be accepted as the 
"leading" form of legal practice. Its acceptance as such, however, led to a 
greater acceptance of the professionalism of the legal specialist. 
The dichotomy between the work and position of the office lawyer and the 
advocate was enormous. The advocate was a public figure, practicing his art 
in the courtroom for juries, reporters and the general public; office lawyers 
were anonymous figures engaged in activities in the privacy of their offices. 
The advocate attracted business by making a reputation for himself in 
notorious cases drawing public attention; the office lawyer attracted business 
by directing public or governmental attention to anyone other than his client. 
The advocate, at least the plaintiffs attorney, represented most of his clients 
for one case only; the office lawyer might represent one client in a number of 
legal matters. The advocate represented an individualistic ethos; the office 
lawyer, as a member of a law firm, represented a collective ethos. 90 
Some changes to the work of lawyers were accepted readily. The 
absorption of conveyancing work by title companies was defended on 
efficiency grounds. 91 The deposing of the trial lawyer from the pinnacle of 
the profession, on the other hand, was resisted for reasons which today would 
be regarded as professionalism reasons. The office lawyer was attacked for 
lacking both independence from his client and knowledge of law. 
B. The Business of Lawyers: 1900-1945 
An article in the 1901 Yale Law Journal by a San Francisco lawyer named 
George Shelton set in relief the fear, as his title made clear, of Law as a 
Business. 92 To Shelton, one cause of the decline of the profession of law was 
shrewdness and a large professional income. The measure of his professional worth 
is his dollar-producing value. If this is the criterion of success, the business lawyer 
is undoubtedly successful , but he is not the great lawyer. His reward is pecuniary; 
that of his brother in the Courts is found in the estimation of his professional ability 
and skill by his brethren of the Bar, and an appreciative public . The business of the 
Court lawyer calls for intellectual capacity of a high order, developed by assiduous 
study of the law as a science, and by literary culture. That of the business lawyer is, 
to a large extent, commercial. 
STRONG, supra note 44, at 127-28. 
90. The biographies of the great advocates are all histories of the lawyers, not their firms . 
Conversely, the "biographies" of the founders of the large corporate law firms are more histories 
of the firms than biographies of the founders . 
91. See George W. Bristol, The Passing of the Legal Profession, 22 YALE L.J. 590, 590-92 
(1913); Robert T. Platt, The Decadence of Law as a Profession and Its Growth as a Business, 
12 YALE L.J. 441, 442-44 (1903) ; COHEN, supra note 46, at 269-70. There was less joy, 
particularly by elite lawyers, about the creation of trust companies to handle work formerly 
monopolized by lawyers . 
92 . Shelton, supra note 24 . 
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that "with the advent of the business lawyer has come also greed of gain as the 
prime incentive to professional activity. "93 He also complained, "The 
mercenary spirit which governs the practice has made the contingent fee a 
legitimate source of income. The lawyer becomes the litigant himself. "94 
Shelton felt that contingent fees compromised the integrity of the attorney. 95 
Furthermore, Shelton believed that the results of the rise of the large law firm 
were "the gradual decline of the country practitioner as an influential 
factor, "96 and the disappearance of the independent lawyer. 97 
Seven years later, the Yale Law Journal published an article, written by 
Champ Andrews, echoing that same theme. Titled The Law-A Business or 
a Profession?, 98 this tale of a conversation among a judge, a successful 
lawyer, and the lawyer's law student son argued the debasement of law from 
a profession to a business. Andrews suggested that, "[n]owadays the bigger 
the lawyer, the more he becomes the clerk, the hired man of the business 
man. "99 
Another attack on the commercialization of the profession is found in The 
American Lawyer: As He Was-As He Is-As He Can Be, a book by John R. 
Dos Passos. 100 For the 63-year-old author, organizer of the Sugar 
Trust, 101 the decline in the profession of law was closely connected to the 
change in the calling of the lawyer from advocate to office lawyer. The 
profitability of office practice, and the involvement of lawyers in the business 
affairs of corporate clients, utterly changed the legal profession. Dos Passos, 
like Shelton and Andrews, charged that "law has become a business." 102 
93. Id. at 277. 
94 . Id. at 279. 
95. See id. at 279-80. 
96. Id. at 280. 
97. Id. at 281-82. 
98 . ChampS. Andrews, The Law-A Business or a Profession?, 17 YALE L.J . 602 (1908) . 
99. ld. at 608. 
100. JOHN R. DOS PASSOS, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: AS HE WAS-As HE Is-As HE CAN 
BE (1907). 
101. Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual, supra note 45, at 58. 
102. Dos PASSOS, supra note 100, at 46. A similar complaint heard before the tum of the 
century is found in 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALrn 492 (spec . ed. Legal 
Classics Library 1987) (1888): 
But I am bound to add that some judicious American observers hold that the last 
thirty years have witnessed a certain decadence in the Bar of the greater cities. They 
say that the growth of enormously rich and powerful corporations, willing to pay vast 
sums for questionable services, has seduced the virtue of some counsel whose 
eminence makes their example important . . . . 
One attempt to reinstill the ideals of the profession was the publication from 1907 to 1909 
of Great American Lawyers, biographies of 96 deceased lawyers in eight volumes. The editor 
was William Draper Lewis, Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, whose 
progressive efforts in the ABA and whose work as first director of the American Law Institute 
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At a speech before Harvard University alumni in June 1905, President 
Theodore Roosevelt prayed that businessmen and lawyers adopt lofty ideals in 
public life. He charged: 
We all know that, as things actually are, many of the most influential and 
most highly remunerated members of the bar in every centre of wealth 
make it their special task to work out bold and ingenious schemes by 
which their very wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can evade the 
laws which are made to regulate in the interest of the public the use of 
great wealth. 103 
Roosevelt suggested that instead of blindly adopting the interests of their 
clients in evading the law, lawyers would better serve the public interest by 
creating a spirit of respect for law to "shap[e] the growth of the national 
soul. " 104 
Roosevelt's speech struck a nerve in the profession; a second event struck 
a nerve in the public. During the last half of 1905, in the Aldermanic 
chamber of New York's City Hall, the Armstrong Committee, whose legal 
counsel was a New York lawyer named Charles Evans Hughes, investigated 
the scandal of the life insurance industry. The scandal began over the struggle 
by some of the great fmanciers of the day, including George Gould, E. H. 
Harriman, and Thomas F. Ryan, to take control over the Equitable Life 
Insurance Company. 105 Shortly after beginning his investigation, Hughes 
decided to investigate the entire life insurance industry. Hughes uncovered 
self-dealing, the payment of outrageously high salaries to management, 
dubious "investment" actions, a precipitous decline in dividends even when 
profits skyrocketed, and the self-perpetuation in office of directors and 
executives through the clever use of proxies. 106 From September through 
the end of December, Hughes's investigation captivated the public's interest. 
That there was a close connection between the insurance companies and elite 
make him an interesting figure in the intellectual history of American law and the legal 
profession. On Lewis, see generally Stephen Botein, William Draper Lewis, in DICTIONARY OF 
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY: SUPPLEMENT FOUR, 1946-1950, at 490 (John A. Garraty & Edward T. 
James eds . , 1974). 
103 . Theodore Roosevelt, Address at Harvard University (June 28, 1905), in 4 THEODORE 
ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS 407, 419-20 (1910). 
104. /d. at 420. 
105. See MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885-1910: A STUDY IN THE 
LIMITS OF CORPORATE POWER 245-64 (1963); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVA-
TISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 94-95 (1963). For Hughes's 
view of the Armstrong investigation, see AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES, supra note 51, 
at 121-27. 
106. See KELLER, supra note 105, at 253; GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra 
note 51, at 197-98 . 
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corporate lawyers did not endear the profession to the public. 107 
At the ABA's 1905 annual meeting, its President, Henry St. George 
Tucker, used Roosevelt's speech as a catalyst to urge the Association to begin 
work on a code of ethics. 108 The delegates charged a committee with 
assessing the advisability of adopting a code of ethics. 109 At the ABA's next 
annual meeting, the committee recommended the appointment of another 
committee to draft such a code. 110 The primary sources used for these 
canons of ethics were a series of lectures on legal ethics by a deceased 
Pennsylvania judge named George Sharswood111 and Alabama's 1887 code 
of ethics. The ABA in 1907 published Sharswood' s lectures as a volume of 
its series of annual reports112 and adopted a total of thirty-two Canons of 
Professional Ethics at its 1908 annual meeting. 113 
The 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics contained at least two efforts to 
expunge "commercialism" from the legal profession: Canon 13, which 
.concerned contingent fees , and Canon 27, which forbade lawyers to advertise. 
Canon 13 was the only canon proposed by the Committee on Canons of Ethics 
which was amended. As originally drafted, Canon 13 permitted contingent 
fees only in carefully regulated situations: "Contingent fees may be contracted 
for , but they lead to many abuses and should be under the supervision of the 
court. " 114 A number of ABA members vociferously opposed proposed 
Canon 13, defending contingent fee arrangements on both moral and 
professional grounds.115 Canon 13 was amended to permit lawyers a greater 
flexibility in taking a fee contingent on an award from the jury .116 
107. 
The problem for the legal profession in this was exemplified by Root, who was 
a director of Mutual Life . Though none of the revelations of the investigation 
specifically implicated him in the scandals, nevertheless he had been part of a system 
which the country condemned as dishonest and corrupting and which the state 
legislature now set out to reform. 
GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 51, at 198 . 
108. See Henry S. Tucker, Address of the President at the 28th Annual Meeting of the 
American Bar Association (Aug. 23 , 1905), in 28 A.B.A. REP. 299, 383-88 (1905) (quoting 
Roosevelt, supra note 103). 
109. See Transactions of the 28th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 28 A.B.A. 
REP. 3, 132 (1905) . 
110. See Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 29 A.B.A. REP. 600, 600 
(pt. 1, 1906) . 
111. On Sharswood, see generally Samuel Dickson, George Sharswood, in 6 GREAT 
AMERICAN LAWYERS 123 {William D. Lewis ed ., 1909). 
112. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 43 . 
113. See Transactions of the 31st Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 33 A.B.A. 
REP. 3, 86 {1908). 
114. Transactions of the 31st Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 33 A.B.A. 
REP. 3, 61 {1908) . 
115. See id. at 62-75 . 
116. In its final version, Canon 13 read: "Contingent fees , where sanctioned by law, should 
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Professor Jerold Auerbach has argued that the attack on the contingent fee 
was a class-based attack. In his telling, "[n]othing plunged the professional 
elite deeper into despair than contingent fees and the proliferation of 
negligence lawyers whose practice depended upon them. " 117 I accept that 
the elite were overly concerned with the encampment of "negligence" lawyers 
in the legal profession; however, Auerbach's history ignores the professional-
ism crisis created by the contingent fee. For many lawyers supporting the 
adopting of a code of ethics, the issue of contingent fees was at least as much 
about professional independence as about the exclusion of Jews (or Catholics 
or others) from the legal profession. 
The regulation of contingent fees in the ABA's Canons of Professional 
Ethics was a classic effort of progressive reformers. Like many progressive 
reforms, the Canons presented a number of conservative features. Yet the 
idea behind them was classically progressive because it attempted to create, in 
lawyers, a shield between the market and the system of justice. Today, the 
attempt in the early 1900s to regulate contingent fee agreements can be 
critiqued from either the right or the left. The attack from the right is that the 
market for contingent fee arrangements will solve most (and maybe all) 
inequities, and the attack from the left is, as Auerbach has argued, that the 
attempt to regulate contingent fee arrangements protects the economic interests 
of the proprietary class alone and attempts to maintain an ethnically pure legal 
profession. Although each argument contains some truth, both critiques fail 
to consider the desire of progressives to raise professional standards, 
bureaucratize institutions, and regulate economic markets. There was more 
than a touch of prejudice on the part of many elite lawyers; more crucial, 
however, is that the lawyer's claim to professionalism was premised at least 
partly on his independence, and a failure to regulate contingent fee contracts 
affected the profession's claim to independence. 
Attacks on the unprofessionalism of contingent fees were not new. 
Sharswood's 1854 Essay on Professional Ethics acknowledged the legality of 
contingent fees, but attacked them as ethically improper. Sharswood wrote: 
It is to be observed, then, that such a contract changes entirely the relation 
of counsel to the cause. It reduces him from his high position of an officer 
of the court and a minister of justice, to that of a party litigating his own 
claim. Having now a deep personal interest in the event of the controver-
sy, he will cease to consider himself subject to the ordinary rules of 
professional conduct. 118 
be under the supervision of the Court, in order that clients may be protected from unjust 
charges." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 13 (1908) . 
117. AUERBACH, supra note 87, at 45 . 
118. SHARSWOOD, supra note 43, at 160. Sharswood's entire discussion of contingent fees is 
found in id. at 153-64. 
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George Shelton's attack on the commercialism of the profession primarily 
attacked the business lawyer and secondarily attacked the contingent fee 
arrangement. 119 Julius Henry Cohen's 1916 attack on the commercialization 
of the legal profession includes a strong criticism of the contingent fee 
arrangement, but his attack was less upon the availability of the arrangement 
than upon its unregulated use. Like Sharswood, Cohen believed that the 
contingent fee made the lawyer a principal in the litigation, clouded his 
judgment, and made him a speculator in lawsuits. 120 This did not mean that 
the arrangement was to be outlawed, for Cohen admitted, "[W]here the client 
is poor, this is perhaps the only way by which he may get adequate profes-
sional assistance. " 121 The real issue was the lawyer's independence, for 
Cohen claimed: "Yet every practitioner knows that the contingent fee 
arrangement is more often a convenience for the rich to join with a lawyer in 
speculation over the results of a lawsuit." 122 
The contingent fee arrangement was a side issue for both Shelton and 
Cohen. To Cohen, writing after the adoption of the 1908 Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, the main issue concerning the commercialization of the practice 
of law was the solicitation of clients, prohibited by Canon 27. In Cohen's 
view, once solicitation was permitted, the answer to the question posed by his 
book's title, The Law: Business or Profession?, was "business." Solicitation 
made law a trade, not a profession, and turned one's clients into customers. 
Not only did solicitation lead to the lawyer's dependence upon the client, it 
turned the lawyer from the ideals of disinterested service to the pursuit of 
wealth. 
The first specific charge connecting legal specialization with the 
commercialization of the profession came in 1910. New Jersey gubernatorial 
candidate Woodrow Wilson gave the annual address at the ABA's annual 
meeting that year. Wilson's speech was titled The Lawyer and the Communi-
ty. 123 Wilson began with the assertion that the whole history of society was 
119. Shelton, supra note 24, at 279-80 . 
120. COHEN, supra note 46, at 209-10. 
121. ld. at 209. A similar statement is in SHARSWOOD, supra note 43, at 154: 
For a poor man, who is unable to pay at all, there may be a general understanding 
that the attorney is to be liberally compensated in case of success. What is objected 
to, is an agreement to receive a certain part or proportion of the sum or subject-
matter, in the event of a recovery, and nothing otherwise. 
122. COHEN, supra note 46, at 210. Whether or not this was true, Cohen's language makes 
clear that justifications of regulation of contingent fees necessarily were made on the basis of 
professionalism, not for economic or class reasons. A recent criticism of the inefficiency of the 
contingent fee is contained in BOK, supra note 31, at 141-44. To see Bok use arguments 
progressive reformers have used since at least the turn of the century is striking, but it should not 
be considered surprising. 
123. See Woodrow Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community, Address at the 33d Annual 
Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug. 31, 1910), in 35 A.B.A. REP. 419 (1910) , 
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a struggle for law. 124 After spending some effort to prove this point, he then 
made the traditional knowledge-based claim of lawyers to authority: "We are 
lawyers. This is the field of our knowledge. We are servants of society, 
officers of the courts of justice. " 125 But this was not how the profession act-
ed. 126 Wilson then made the connection: 
A new type of lawyers has been created; and that new type has come 
to be the prevailing type. Lawyers have been sucked into the maelstrom 
of the new business system of the country. That system is highly technical 
and highly specialized. It is divided into distinct sections and provinces, 
each with particular legal problems of its own. Lawyers, therefore, 
everywhere that business has thickened and had a large development, have 
become experts in some special technical field . They do not practise law. 
They do not handle the general, miscellaneous interests of society. They 
are not general counsellors of right and obligation. They do not bear the 
relation to the business of their neighborhoods that the family doctor bears 
to the health of the community in which he lives. The [sic] do not concern 
themselves with the universal aspects of society. The family doctor is 
himself giving place to a score of specialists; and so is also what one might 
call the family solicitor. Lawyers are specialists, like all other men around 
them. The general, broad, universal field of law grows dim and yet more 
dim to their apprehension as they spend year after year in minute 
examination and analysis of a particular part of it; not a small part, it may 
be, perhaps the part which the courts are for the time most concerned 
with, but a part which has undergone a high degree of development, which 
is very technical and many-sided, and which requires the study and 
practice of years for its mastery; and yet a province apart, whose conquest 
necessarily absorbs them and necessarily separates them from the 
dwindling body of general practitioners who used to be our statesmen. 127 
Wilson's solution was that lawyers remember the ideal of service to which 
they were all called. The ideal of service necessitated that lawyers remain 
attuned to the general interest of the country. Specialization led to expert 
counselling of special interests, and the greatest special interest facing the 
country was the interest of the corporation, aided by the "corporation lawyer," 
in circumventing the law. 128 Specialization, then, was incompatible with the 
ideal of service, and incompatible with the definition of professionalism. 
Printed immediately after Wilson's speech in the ABA's Annual Report 
reprinted in Woodrow Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community, 192 N. AM. REV. 604 (1910). 
124. Id. at 419. 
125. ld. at 421. 
126. See id. at 423 . 
127. ld. at 424-25. 
128. See id. at 426-35 . 
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is a paper by Charles W. Moores discussing the legal practice of Abraham 
Lincoln, the symbol of the country lawyer. 129 Lincoln was the type of 
lawyer held out to the public (and the profession) as embodying the best traits 
of the profession. 130 He practiced law in the traditional manner, represent-
ing clients in all kinds of legal matters, and representing any clients who came 
to him. He refused to let the passions of the community determine the vigor 
of his defense of one who was criminally accused, and he remained an 
independent lawyer who knew the whole field of law. 
The internal crisis faced by the legal profession during the 1910s involved 
issues both of independence and of knowledge. Further, these issues were 
found in bold relief at both ends of the legal profession. The elite lawyer, as 
a specialist representing the interests of his corporate master, appeared to lack 
both the breadth of knowledge and independence expected of the lawyer. The 
negligence lawyer, whose knowledge of law was suspect, proliferated as the 
number of unregulated law schools increased. With the elite lawyer, little was 
attempted to remedy this lack of professionalism. 131 Dealing with the 
negligence lawyer was another matter. 
An emerging professional class of law professors at the "national" law 
schools132 believed that night and part-time law schools provided an insuffi-
cient professional education and that the students enrolled in these schools 
should not enter the profession. 133 In 1913, the ABA's Committee on Legal 
Education and Admissions to the Bar requested the Carnegie Foundation for 
the Advancement of Teaching to investigate legal education. 134 The Founda-
129. See Moores, supra note 16. The Director of the Lincoln Legal Papers Project also has 
claimed that Lincoln would take any clients who requested his services and has called him "the 
ultimate general practitioner." Cameron McWhirter, Unveiling the Mystery of Lincoln's Early 
Years, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 3, 1993, at 1-L, 5-L. 
130. Indeed, Alfred Hemenway called Lincoln "a typical American lawyer." Hemenway, 
supra note 46, at 400-01. 
131. However, blatant conflicts of interest were frowned on. In 1921, the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York laid charges against elite lawyer Thomas Chadbourne. The 
accusations were (1) that Chadbourne, while representing George Gould, the executor of Jay 
Gould's will, failed to inform the court of improprieties that he knew George Gould to have 
committed as executor, and (2) that Chadbourne had represented both George Gould and the 
·Missouri Pacific Railroad when Gould tried to take over the railroad. The Grievance Committee 
of the Association found a basis in the charges and took Chadbourne to court, but the Appellate 
Division later acquitted Chadbourne. See GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 
51 , at 368-70; THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS CHADBOURNE, supra note 59, at 87-94. 
132. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners, 1900-1922, 
in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 551 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971); John H. 
Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The Professional-
ization of the American Law Professor, 35 J . LEGAL Eouc. 311 (1985) . 
133. See Auerbach, supra note 132, at 575-80. 
134. See Transactions of the 36th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 38 A.B.A. 
REP. 5, 25 (1913). 
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tion agreed to fund a study of legal education directed by a nonlaWYer named 
Alfred Z. Reed. 
A decade earlier, the Foundation inquired about funding a study of legal 
education and was rebuffed by the ABA. The Foundation then turned to a 
study, under the direction of Abraham Flexner, of American medical 
education. The result of this study, widely known as the Flexner Report, was 
published in 1910. 135 The Flexner Report was credited with enhancing the 
prestige of the medical profession and the future care of patients by increasing 
the standards of medical education. One apparent consequence of the Flexner 
Report was a radical reduction of the number of medical schools and medical 
students, although one historian of American medicine believes that such a 
view misstates the role of the Flexner Report. 136 
When the Foundation agreed to investigate the state of legal education in 
1913, it was the hope of the elite of the legal profession that this report would 
have the same impact on legal education as they believed the Flexner Report 
had had on medical education. Due in part to the intervention of World War 
I, and in part to Reed's petulance at having his work upstaged by Reginald 
Heber Smith's book Justice and the Poor, 131 Reed's report was not published 
until 1921. 
Even seventy-plus years after its publication, Reed's report, Training for 
the Public Profession of the Law, 138 is an amazing document. Reed's report 
was propelled by two ideas: first, that the profession of law was a public 
profession; and second, that a unitary bar not only did not exist, it could not 
exist. 
As members of a public profession, laWYers provided services to the 
community in which they lived and were also part of the "governing 
mechanism of the state. "139 As such, the laWYer functioned in a broadly 
135. ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (191 0). 
136. "[C]hanging economic realities, rather than the Flexner report, were what killed so many 
medical schools in the years after 1906." PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN MEDICINE 118 (1982) . 
137. See ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 
1850s TO THE 1980s 115 (1983) . 
138 . REED , supra note 41. 
139. REED, supra note 41 , at 3. A recent history of legal education by Professor Paul 
Carrington shares Reed 's conclusion about the public or political nature of the legal profession, 
while disagreeing with his conclusion about the unattainability of a unitary bar. See Paul D. 
Carrington, One Law: The Role of Legal Education in the Opening of the Legal Profession Since 
1776, 44 FLA. L. REv. 501 (1992) . Carrington wrote: 
[Most Jaw teachers] have supposed . .. that the enduring health of our democratic 
legal institutions depended on sharing the legal profession as broadly as possible. At 
the same time, . .. they have been generally right in insisting that those who share 
the profession should recognize the unity of the common professional enterprise: one 
Jaw, one profession whose work is informed by common values, with a shared duty 
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political manner. Lawyers were political not simply in the sense of providing 
society with many of its legislators and most of its judges; they were political 
because "private individuals cannot secure justice without the aid of a special 
professional order to represent and to advise them." 140 According to Reed, 
that was the reason lawyers were officers of the court. 
Regarding the unitary bar, Reed concluded, "The evil-the very great 
evil-of the present situation, as a result of which all part-time legal education 
now rests under a justified cloud, lies in the perpetuation of the theory of a 
unitary bar, whose attainments are to be tested by uniform examinations. "141 
In Reed's view, there was no such thing as a unitary bar or "'a' standard 
lawyer." 142 The bar was widely differentiated, based in large part on the 
educational background of the lawyer. The fiction of a unitary bar caused the 
differing types of law schools to attempt to hinder each other's development 
rather than prepare their own students for the various kinds of legal practice 
awaiting the graduates of each type of law school. 
Because the unitary bar was unattainable, Reed concluded that night or 
part-time law school programs of education should not be abolished. As a 
public profession, "the interests . . . of the community demand that participa-
tion in the making and administration of the law shall be kept accessible to 
Lincoln's plain people." 143 Instead of continuing to strive for the unattain-
able, Reed proposed formal recognition of a stratified bar based both upon the 
type of legal education the lawyer received and, possibly, the lawyer's 
functions in the community. 144 
Reed implicitly accepted two premises of the differences between the elite 
and nonelite practitioners. First, he accepted the inevitability of legal 
specialization: One reason for formal recognition of a differentiated bar was 
that "[t]he task of preparing students to engage in the general practice of the 
law has now become a very difficult one. " 145 Second, he assumed that only 
nonelite lawyers were advocates, or trial lawyers, stating, "Conveyancing, 
probate practice, criminal law and trial work are examples of topics that seem 
particularly appropriate for the relatively superficial schools. " 146 
Unlike the rest of his report, Reed's statements about the reality of the 
to one public . 
Id. at 603. 
140. REED, supra note 41, at 3. 
141. ld. at 57. 
142. ld. 
143. Id. at 418. 
144. See id. at 237-39. 
145. ld. at 419. 
146. Id. at 419. This was a qualified assessment only, for Reed noted , "All this is mere 
guesswork . ... , " id., and also suggested that stratification might be based on "the economic 
status of the client," id. 
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differentiated bar were quite conclusory, and, by his own admission, his 
predictions about the work of different types of lawyers amounted to 
guesswork. By premising his recommendations on the idea of a differentiated 
bar, Reed touched an exposed nerve of the profession. For at least forty 
years, the goal of bar leaders and legal academics was to increase professional 
knowledge in order to enhance the authority of the profession. Raising the 
educational standards among all law schools offered the best opportunity to 
increase professional knowledge. Those devoted to raising educational 
standards believed that Reed's insistence that a place be kept for "superficial" 
law schools-and, of course, for "superficially" trained lawyers-would result 
in a lessening of professionalism. 147 
By 1921, the large148 law firm was a set piece in the professional 
landscape. However, the profession was still unable to fit specialization 
comfortably within the concept of professionalism. Reed's willingness to let 
local law schools teach their students conveyancing, probate, criminal law, 
and, most importantly, trial work was based on the unstated premises that the 
professional hierarchy began with corporate work, that the elite lawyer was not 
an advocate, and that the elite and nonelite lawyers resided in at least two 
different legal worlds. Although Reed believed that he was stating the 
obvious, he was also striking (possibly inadvertently) in at least three ways at 
the two pillars of the profession: knowledge and independence. First, Reed's 
proposal that the profession be formally realigned contemplated that the idea 
of law as a science could be limited only to some (read "elite") lawyers. For 
the nonelite lawyer, law was not a science. Second, Reed categorized "law" 
based on the lawyer's type of practice. In his scheme, a lawyer's knowledge 
would not be of all of "law," but only some of it. Third, any Reed-inspired 
attempt to offer part-time and night law schools a better chance to survive 
threatened the independence of lawyers by creating an oversupply, particularly 
an oversupply of lawyers who were deemed "unfit." 
Training for the Public Profession of the Law was not published until 
August 1921. In 1920, legal academics at the most prestigious law schools 
attended the meeting of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the 
Bar at the 1920 ABA convention and forced the creation of a Special 
Committee on Legal Education. 149 At the July 1921 meeting, that commit-
tee, whose chairman was the eminence grise of the legal profession, Elihu 
147. There was always the fear of a neo-Jacksonian outburst, recalling a time during which 
egalitarianism overrode any concern for standards . Coursing through this quest for standards, 
of course, was prejudice. 
148. "Large" in 1921 is very small by today's standards . See Wayne K. Hobson, Symbol of 
the New Profession: Emergence of the Large Law Firm, 1870-1915, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS, 
supra note 45, at 3, 5. 
149. See Proceedings of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 45 A.B.A. 
REP. 465 (1920) . 
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Root, reported its fmdings. The Root Committee concluded that legal 
education was adequately undertaken only in law schools. It proposed both 
increasing educational requirements before entering law school from a high 
school diploma to successful completion of two years of college and making 
the bar examination a prerequisite to the practice of law. tso These proposals 
ensured that all graduates of law schools were competent to practice law. 
By engaging in "guesswork" regarding the functions of the differentiated 
bars, Reed left himself open to criticism of his entire claim that there was no 
such thing as a unitary bar. 1s1 Anticipating the Reed Report, 1s2 the Root 
Committee further claimed that the legal profession was indeed a unified 
profession. The Committee's report was adopted by the ABA, and it was later 
used to persuade state and local bar associations and examiners to raise 
standards for admissions to the bar. 
The elite of the profession widely rejected Reed's report. The intensity 
of the drive to maintain an outward unity in the legal profession led to 
increasing interest in bar admissions as a gatekeeper to the profession. Both 
legal educators and bar examiners worked to provide a semblance of a legal 
canon. Although it held no formal status as an accrediting agency, in 1923 the 
ABA began certifying law schools as being in compliance with its new, 
uniform standards. It also successfully promoted stricter evaluations of bar 
applicants by state bar examining authorities.m Finally, also in 1923, the 
elite of the profession organized the American Law Institute, dedicated to 
formulating a restatement of the law. 1s4 
150. See Report of the Special Committee to the Section of Legal Education and Admissions 
to the Bar of the American Bar Association, 46 A.B .A. REP. 679 (1921). 
151. Albert Kales, a legal academic, made just such an attack. See Albert Kales , 35 HARV. 
L. REv. 96, 97-98 (1921) (book review) . After setting forth Reed's opinion of a differentiated 
bar, Kales wrote: 
Such an analysis of our present situation and such a program for emphasizing it in the 
future cannot be too severely condemned. It is superficial. It is false . It is impolitic .. 
It can only end in disaster to the graduates of university law schools and, therefore, 
disaster to the university law schools themselves ... . Successful lawyers do serve 
the rich. They are far from leaders of the first rank, however, unless they maintain 
so independent a position in the community that any interest feels safe in employing 
them. Witness Mr. Hughes' employment by the miners in the Indianapolis cases . 
Id. at 98 . For Reed 's somewhat evasive response, see Alfred Z. Reed, Scholarship or Opinion?, 
35 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1922). 
152. According to Susan K. Boyd, the official historian of the ABA Section of Legal Education 
and Admissions to the Bar, "[t]he Root Committee was given advance copies of Reed's book." 
SUSAN K. BOYD, THE ABA'S FIRSf SECTION: AssURING A QUALIFIED BAR 26 (1993). 
153 . In addition to organizing, in January 1922, a Special Conference on Legal Education, id. 
at 24, the ABA Section of Legal Education sponsored , in 1931, the creation of the National 
Conference of Bar Examiners, id. at 37. 
154. A history of the origins of the American Law Institute is found in N.E.H. Hull, 
Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute , 8 L. 
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Unlike the flrst two decades of the century, when prominent lawyers 
sounded a call to prevent law from becoming a business, the opposition to the 
methods and efficiencies of "business" all but disappeared in the 1920s.m 
In 1924, Felix Frankfurter wrote his friend, large-flrm lawyer Charles C. 
Burlingham: "Don't you think it would be like a breath of fresh air in our 
dank national atmosphere if a few lawyers who did matter would say we don't 
like all this degradation and enveloping commercialism and general corrupting 
atmosphere?" 156 When John W. Davis's name was floated for the Demo-
cratic nomination for President in 1924, Frankfurter wrote in several unsigned 
editorials in The New Republic151 that Davis was an "employe of Big 
Business" 158 and concluded, "Latterly clients have had lawyers and not 
lawyers clients. " 159 Despite Frankfurter's warnings, for the brightest 
Harvard Law School graduates of the 1920s, the pinnacle of the legal 
profession became the private practice of law on Wall Street. 160 In a May 
1921 speech given to students at Boston University Law School, Chief Justice 
Taft urged newly graduated lawyers t~ avoid losing their independence and 
identity and not practice law solely in behalf of corporations. 161 Taft 
condemned the fact that "[a]ble lawyers have yielded to the inducement of 
large salaries and embraced exclusively the cause of large corporations. "162 
By the end of the decade, specialization was entrenched in the large law 
flrm. 163 This realization also was flrst recognized, in a slight fashion, in the 
amended Canons of Professional Ethics. The original Canons made no 
mention of specialization or restriction of practice. A lawyer knew law. This 
statement is reflected in the appraisal of Emory Buckner by his good friend 
Felix Frankfurter. When Felix Frankfurter was asked to recommend a lawyer 
to handle a complex admiralty case, Frankfurter responded: "'Get Emory 
Buckner-he's the best trial lawyer in New York. That makes him the best 
& HIST. REv. 55 (1990). I have discussed the intellectual influence of the American Law 
Institute ' s work on the codification of evidence in Michael Ariens, Progress Is Our Only Product: 
Legal Reform and the Codification of Evidence, 17 LAW & Soc. INQ. 213 (1992). 
155. The information in this paragraph is taken from AUERBACH, supra note 87, at 130-57. 
Not all opposition vanished, however. In 1924, Julius Henry Cohen revised and reissued his 
1916 cautionary discussion of the dangers of commercialism, The Law: Business or Profession?. 
156. Felix Frankfurter, Letter to Charles C . Burlingham (Feb. 14, 1924), quoted in 
AUERBACH, supra note 87, at 139. 
157. AUERBACH, supra note 87, at 139, attributes the editorials to Frankfurter. 
158 . John W. Davis, 39 NEW REPUBLIC 224, 225 (1924). 
159. Why Mr. Davis Shouldn't Run , 38 NEW REPUBLIC 193, 193 (1924). 
160. See AUERBACH, supra note 87, at 140. 
161 . William H. Taft, Legal Ethics , Address Before the Boston University Law School (May 
9, 1921), in 1 B.U. L. REv. 233, 242-44 (1923). 
162. /d. at 244. 
163 . See HOBSON, supra note 84, at 402-03 . 
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admiralty lawyer, even if he's never had an admiralty case. "' 164 
The first formal recognition of the advance of legal specialization was the 
adoption by the ABA of Canon 45 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. 
Added to the Canons of Ethics in 1928, it declared that "specialists" were not 
exempt from the principles of the Canons. 165 Five years later, the ABA first 
acknowledged the professional and economic value of specialization by 
adopting Canon 46 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Canon 46 formally 
permitted lawyers undertaking specialized legal work exclusively for other 
lawyers to advertise such specialized legal work in a "dignified" manner in 
legal periodicals. 166 
The 1920s, not surprisingly, was the decade in which corporate lawyers 
were accepted at the top of the legal profession. Many of the law firms 
created by first-generation business lawyers were reorganized. John Davis 
reorganized the law firm created by J. P. Morgan's counsel Francis Lynde 
Stetson into the firm known today as Davis, Polk and Wardwell. 167 In the 
mid-1920s, the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell was reorganized, and John 
Foster Dulles became one of its managing directors. 168 The law firm of 
Shearman & Sterling grew greatly after a merger in 1918 with the firm of 
Cary & Carroll. 169 The firm of Root, Clark, Buckner & Howland, consist-
ing of six lawyers (including, as counsel, Elihu Root) at the beginning of 
1919, 170 consisted of more than thirty lawyers by the end of 1920,171 and 
thirty-nine by 1922.172 
The growth of the large law firm was phenomenal. Professor Wayne 
Hobson has noted that between 1915 and 1924, the number of major law firms 
in five American cities grew markedly in number and size.173 In 1915, 
Hobson counted twenty-seven major firms containing 237 lawyers; nine years 
later, there were 101 major firms containing 1,303 lawyers. 174 In 1929, 
James Grafton Rogers wrote about the historical development of the American 
lawyer. 175 Calling the model modem lawyer a "business lawyer, " Rogers 
164. MARTIN MAYER, EMORY BUCKNER 1 (1968) (quoting Felix Frankfurter) . 
165. See Canons of Professional Ethics, 53 A.B.A. REP. 769, 769 n. *, 781 (1928) . 
166. See Canons of Professional Ethics , 58 A.B.A. REP. 697, 709 (1933) . 
167. See HARBAUGH, supra note 70, at 251-55. 
168 . See LISAGOR & LIPSIUS, supra note 71, at 100-01. 
169. EARLE, supra note 67, at 205-07 (noting that the merger was effective January 1, 1919). 
170. MAYER, supra note 164, at 126. 
171. Id. at 127. 
172. GERALD T. DUNNE, GRENVILLE CLARK: PuBLIC CITIZEN 47 (1986) . 
173. The cities studied were New York, Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, and Kansas City . 
Hobson, supra note 148, at 5. 
174. See id. 
175. James G. Rogers , Types of the American Lawyer, Past and Present, 15 A.B.A. J. 531 , 
534 (1929) . 
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stated, "Today this model represents the ambition of most young men, the 
standard of greatest achievement. " 176 Three years later, Rogers wrote 
American Bar Leaders, biographical essays of the presidents of the ABA 
during its first fifty years. In his foreword, Rogers spoke confidently of "the 
march on and off the stage in tum of the soldier-lawyer, the orator or 
advocate, the 'railroad lawyer,' the 'trust-buster,' the 'business lawyer,' and 
the entry at last of the international lawyer on the scene. "177 This inevitable 
progression of the legal profession toward bigger and better seemed as natural 
as the progression of the economic structure of American society. 
The emergence of the corporate lawyer as a "leader" of the bar occurred 
in part as a consequence of the assumption by second-generation business 
lawyers of roles in bar associations and politics. 178 Both Charles Evans 
Hughes and John W. Davis were nominated for President of the United States. 
Elihu Root served as Secretary of State and Senator from the state of New 
York. All three served as Presidents of' the ABA during its maturation as an 
institution claiming to represent the American legal profession, and each also 
served a term as President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York. On the other hand, first-generation business lawyer John W. Sterling 
never joined any bar association and never participated in any professional 
activities or in public life. None of the name partners in the law firm 
presently known as Cravath, Swaine and Moore ever served as President of 
either the American or New York City bar associations. 179 
It should not have been surprising that, in the midst of the Great 
Depression, there was a reaction against the perceived excesses of large 
corporations and their advisors, the corporate lawyers. During the 1930s, the 
issue was neither whether the corporate lawyer represented the pinnacle of the 
profession nor whether legal specialization existed; instead, the issue was 
whether the corporate lawyer was properly undertaking his role as a 
professional. 
Two remarkable articles drawing attention to the connection between legal 
specialization and commercialism were published in 1933. One was an essay, 
titled Modem Legal Profession, written by Professor Adolf Berle for the 
176. ld. 
177. JAMES G. ROGERS, AMERICAN BAR LEADERS v (1932) . Essentially the same statement 
is found in Rogers , supra note 175, at 534. 
178. Professor Samuel Haber, in his history of the professions, including the legal profession, 
from 1750 to 1900, has noted that first-generation corporate lawyers were not bar association 
leaders . See HABER, supra note 21 , at 212 (noting that corporate lawyers Francis Lynde Stetson 
and James Dill were not leaders of the ABA) . 
179. From 1905 to 1922, however, Edward Cairns Henderson was a name partner of the 
Cravath firm. Although never President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 
he served a number of years as chairman of its library committee. See GEORGE MARTIN, 
CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 51, at 336. 
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Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. 180 The other was a paper written by 
Karl Llewellyn for The American Academy of Political and Social Science and 
published under the title, The Bar Specializes-With What Results?. 181 
Berle's article is a brilliant sociological dissection of the American legal 
profession, particularly compared with the legal profession in civil-law 
countries. Berle first noted that, though "[i]n theory all lawyers were 
alike," 182 the American legal profession was hierarchically segregated on the 
basis of function and size. 183 At the top was the law factory, the large law 
firm which acted largely as business counsel; in the middle were lawyers 
practicing in firms of from three to twenty members, who divided their work 
among the courts, business, and politics; and at the bottom were the vast 
majority of lawyers, practicing alone or in pairs, whose primary function was 
to handle the affairs of individuals and small businesses. 184 It was the first 
group, the business lawyers, which especially aroused Berle's ire. 
The transformation of the economy at the end of the nineteenth century, 
according to Berle, led to the transformation of the lawyer. 185 Instead of 
protecting the rights of individuals from exploitation by private interests, the 
business lawyer "became a virtual annex to some group of financial promoters, 
manipulators or industrialists. " 186 The business lawyer had sacrificed his 
independence for the monetary rewards of corporate practice, contributing only 
"the creation of a legal framework for the economic system, built largely 
around the modem corporation." 187 Berle noted, "The impression grew that 
the lawyer existed to serve and not to counsel his clients. "188 The modem 
view of the lawyer as servant of the client justified the lawyer in using any 
legal lever available to further the client's interests. The traditional view was 
that the lawyer was an officer of the court, a counsellor of the client, and 
consequently duty-bound to serve justice, even at the expense of his client's 
interests. 189 The modem view, in Berle's opinion, was that the lawyer was 
180. A.A. Berle, Jr., Modern Legal Profession, in 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 340 (Edwin R.A. Seligman et al. eds., 1933). 
181. K.N. Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results?, 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & Soc. SCI. 177 (1933). This paper was later republished in the Commercial Law 
League's journal , the Commercial Law Journal. See K. N. Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With 
What Results?, 39 CoM. L.J. 336 (1934). 
182. Berle, supra note 180, at 340. 
183 . ld. at 340-41. 
184. Id. at 342. 
185 . Id. at 341. 
186. ld. 
187. ld. 
188. ld. 
189. ld. at 343. 
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"the paid servant of his client. " 190 To Berle, the "commercialization" of the 
bar caused lawyers to abandon their traditional social functions of influencing 
public life and law in America. 191 Instead of enabling the lawyer to act as 
an independent influence for the public good, "the specialized learning of the 
lawyer was his private stock in trade to be exploited for his private bene-
fit. "192 
Llewellyn began his paper with the observation that "[t]he most significant 
fact about the modem metropolitan bar" was that it had "moved mass-wise out 
of court work, out of a general practice akin to that of the family doctor, into 
highly paid specialization in the service of large corporations. " 193 The 
result, according to Llewellyn, was several-fold: "Those-who-have" were 
represented exceedingly well; trial courts were deprived of the best lawyers, 
who practiced law in their offices advising corporations; and the poor man's 
case was left unserved. 194 The solution, according to Llewellyn, was for the 
metropolitan bar association to establish offices in various parts of the city to 
act as clearinghouses for the legal problems of the poor, providing those 
persons with the names of several attorneys, each of whom would be willing 
to provide the necessary legal services. 19S 
Neither essay questioned the expertise or knowledge of the lawyer in the 
law factory. As legal progressives, both Berle and Llewellyn were interested 
in improving the quality of service provided by lawyers. Llewellyn readily 
acknowledged that quality craftSmanship had been attained in the law factory. 
Indeed, part of Llewellyn's acceptance of the increasing emphasis on 
specialization in the practice of law was to equate specialized legal practice 
with professionalism. Llewellyn's complaint was not with specialization, but 
with the maldistribution of the work of lawyers. 196 Berle's broader com-
190. ld. 
191. ld. at 34344. 
192. ld. at 344. 
193 . Llewellyn, supra note 181, at 177 . 
. 194. ld. at 179-80. 
195. Id. at 180-81. 
196. Llewellyn first made the complaint two years earlier, in a review of a book titled A 
Lawyer Tells the Truth. Llewellyn wrote: 
Let this be written large, for senior partners in law-factories to ponder on: Law 
does not exist for corporation executives alone. It is not, even, for stockholders 
alone, or those whose income tax can, under proper counselling, be cut. The courts, 
especially, are for all citizens who have, or believe they have, rights of which their 
own efforts fail to induce fulfillment. And the financial importance of a case turns 
quite as much on the marginal utility of the sum in question to the litigant as it does 
on the absolute size of the sum involved. Let this also be written on the walls: 
making court services effective is not a matter of radicalism. Accepting the criterion 
not of what in some Utopia ought to be, but of what our polity has for some centuries 
professed, courts stand on one footing with the roads and parks, not with a "right to 
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plaint was that this maldistribution was performed in the blind service of those 
who wielded great economic power, to the exclusion of the public-service 
model of the legal profession. Although both were leery of some aspects of 
legal specialization, both saw specialization as creating advantages for the 
proper practice of law. 
llewellyn's call for a redistribution of legal resources was not heeded. 
There was, however, a rise in complaints by the progressive press about the 
trends in the practice of law. 197 
One year later, in a speech dedicating the Law Quadrangle at the 
University of Michigan, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone excoriated the corporate 
lawyer for failing his public responsibility to the community: 
The changed character of the lawyer's work has made it difficult for 
him to contemplate his function in its new setting, to see himself and his 
occupation in proper perspective. No longer does his list of clients 
represent a cross section of society; no longer do his contacts make him 
the typical representative and interpreter of his community. The demands 
of practice are more continuous and exacting. He has less time for 
reflection upon other than immediate professional undertakings. 198 
The type of lawyer Stone attacked most fiercely was the corporate lawyer: 
"The successful lawyer of our day more often than not is the proprietor or 
general manager of a new type of factory, whose legal product is increasingly 
the result of mass production methods. More and more the amount of his 
income is the measure of professional success. " 199 Even so, Stone believed 
that specialization was necessary, and, in raising the level of the lawyer's 
proficiency and technical skill, a beneficial consequence of the change of the 
role of the lawyer in the modem commercial and industrial society of the 
United States. The harm was that a learned profession had become an 
"obsequious servant of business, and [become] tainted .. . with the morals 
and manners of the market place in its most anti-social manifestations. "200 
Because they were engaged in the highly specialized service of business and 
work," a "right to bread" or a "right to shelter. " It is the business of the bar to see 
that people have access to the courts, and to fair treatment in them. 
Llewellyn, supra note 18, at 1217. 
197. See Mitchell Dawson, Frankenstein, Inc., 19 AM. MERCURY 274 (1930); William M. 
Downing, New York Lawyer, 91 ScRmNERS MAG. 23 (1932) ; John W. Harrington, The Big 
Shops of the Law, 11 AM. MERCURY 143 (1927) ; Lundberg, supra note 18; Ferdinand Lundberg , 
The Legal Profession: A Social Phenomenon, 178 HARPER's MAG. 1 (1938); Ferdinand 
Lundberg, The Priesthood of the Law, 178 HARPER's MAG. 515 (1939) . 
198. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, Address at the Dedication of the 
University of Michigan Law Quadrangle (June 15, 1934), in 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1934) . 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 7. 
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finance, modem leaders of the bar were both less well-rounded and less 
independent than bar leaders of the past. 
Instead of being pessimistic, however, Stone was optimistic that 
specialization placed the bar in the position where "the possibilities of its 
influence are almost beyond calculation. "201 In Stone's view, it was neces-
sary to reformulate the calling of the lawyer in light of the changes in modem 
society. The goal of higher standards of conduct, a goal that could be 
achieved in part by through the influence of legal academics and law schools, 
would provide the bar with another opportunity to perform its duty to society. 
The nonelite practitioner struggled greatly during the Great Depression. 
While elite practitioners like John Foster Dulles and John W. Davis earned 
enormous incomes, a large percentage of lawyers were barely eking out a 
living. 202 
Although specialization was ensconced in the large law firm, the nonelite 
lawyer remained, in fact and in perception, a general practitioner. In 1937, 
the ABA created a Special Committee on the Economic Condition of the Bar, 
which collected and analyzed several extant surveys of the legal profession. 
The Committee's conclusion concerning a survey of the legal profession in 
Wisconsin was: "A general absence of specialization, a fairly miscellaneous 
clientele, and a large amount of work in the fields of property, collections, and 
torts, appear to be characteristic of the run of the bar. "203 A survey by Yale 
Law School Dean Charles Clark and Research Associate Emma Corstvet of 
fifty lawyers practicing law in New Haven and Hartford tried to make a claim 
for specialization not made by lawyers themselves. The respondents claimed 
that they were not specialists and that specialization did not pay, but Clark and 
Corstvet concluded that specialization "was more general than first believed," 
as long as specialization was defmed as a type of work undertaken more than 
twenty percent of the time. 204 
On March 1, 1941, the Seventh Annual Cincinnati Conference was held 
in Cincinnati, Ohio. Titled Law and Lawyers in the Modem World, the 
Conference was devoted to conditions of practice and efforts to make the 
administration of justice more efficient and inexpensive. Among the speeches 
was a talk about legal specialization by a lawyer named Walter Fisher. Fisher 
first noted the "narrow judgment" argument: "It is true that specialization 
tends to make men narrow, rather than broad, and that lawyers with breadth 
of experience and point of view are greatly needed. "20S With that caution, 
201. /d. at 9. 
202. See SPECIAL COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, 
THE ECONOMICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 15 (1938). 
203. /d. at 31. 
204. Charles E. Clark & Emma Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public: An A.A.L.S. Survey, 
47 YALE L.J. 1272, 1288 (1938). 
205. Walter T. Fisher, Address at the Cincinnati Conference on Law and Lawyers in the 
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Fisher then turned to the need and value of legal specialization, stating, 
"Specialization has the advantage of permitting a specific task to be done better 
and cheaper. "206 In addition, Fisher opined that specialization would drive 
out bad lawyers in favor of good lawyers. 207 Finally, Fisher predicted that 
specialization was the future of the profession, claiming, "[U]nless the lawyer 
specializes, the sphere of his usefulness is bound to dwindle. "208 Fisher then 
discussed the Chicago Lawyer Reference Plan, which allowed members of the 
Chicago Bar Association to list themselves as specialists in one or more fields 
of law. 209 
At least one of the other panelists agreed with Fisher's prediction about 
the need for, and utility of, legal specialization. 210 The concluding talk was 
then given by future Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge, who said, "I shall 
say only this: I agree with Mr. Fisher, not only that specialization is here, that 
it is going to stay, but that it is bound to increase. That is simply because the 
nature of our society and, therefore, the service the lawyer must render to it, 
are going to continue becoming more highly specialized. That is as inevitable 
as the further evolution of machines. "211 
Although none of the participants in the symposium disputed the future 
importance of legal specialization, one intriguing fact was noted with little 
comment and no explanation. Most respondents to the Chicago Bar 
Association's plan to provide a reference service requested that they be listed 
as general practitioners, not as specialists. A total of 267 respondents listed 
themselves as general practitioners. Only 160 lawyers claimed inclusion in 
one or more of the seventeen categories of specialized law practice. Twenty-
six respondents listed themselves as specialists in real estate, the highest 
number of self-proclaimed specialists in any field.212 
By the beginning of World War II, elite lawyers fully embraced 
specialized legal practice. Progressive academics also accepted the necessity 
and utility of legal specialization. On the other hand, nonelite practitioners 
remained wedded to the concept of the country lawyer, or general practitio-
ner.213 
Modern World (Mar. 1, 1941), in 15 U. CIN. L. REV. 123, 158 (1941) . 
206 . Jd. at 159. 
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Modern World (Mar. 1, 1941), in 15 U. CIN . L. REv. 166, 173 (1941). 
211. Wiley Rutledge, Address at the Cincinnati Conference on Law and Lawyers in the 
Modern World (Mar. 1, 1941), in 15 U. CIN. L. REV . 228, 236 (1941). 
212 . Id. at 161. 
213 . That the idea of the country lawyer as an ideal type remained important in the bar's 
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C. The Administrative State and the Practice of Law: 1945-69 
Shortly after the end of World War II, the American Law Institute, 
together with the ABA, began a national program of continuing legal 
education. 214 The project was an effort to ensure the professionalism of 
lawyers by enhancing their knowledge of law. As the institutional bar worked 
to increase professionalism by organizing continuing legal education programs, 
commentators noted the fact of extensive legal specialization. In announcing 
the reversal of its previously held opinion that professional announcements sent 
to lawyers and nonlawyers which included a statement of legal specialization 
were improper, the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York State 
Bar Association reported that it "recognized that specialization of the Bar has 
increased as specialization in every other field has increased, and felt that to 
shut one's eyes to this obvious development was futile . "215 In 1949, 
corporate lawyer Robert T. Swaine belatedly responded to progressive critics 
of the 1930s and defended the large-firm lawyer's practice, including its 
specialization, in the American Bar Association Journal. 216 That same year, 
Fortune magazine proflled the American legal profession and noted that the 
lawyers in the largest law firms were "highly specialized operator[s]. "217 
Beginning in 1950, the ABA began its efforts to formally recognize legal 
specialization. The ABA appointed a special committee to determine whether 
to amend Canon 27, which forbade nearly all forms of advertising, to permit 
lawyers to place on their letterhead recognized specialties.218 The next year, 
despite prior adverse formal opinions from the Committee on Professional 
Ethics, the ABA amended Canon 27 to allow admiralty and patent lawyers to 
state their specialties on letterheads or shingles. 219 The stated reason of the 
ABA's House of Delegates for creating the exception for admiralty and patent 
lawyers was "that substantially the entire time of lawyers in these fields is 
spent in their specialty, and that little or no practice by these specialized 
lawyers is done in other fields . "220 A 1951 article in the American Bar 
conception of itself may be indicated in John W. Davis ' s perception of himself as a lawyer. 
Jerold Auerbach has noted that Davis, the most visible symbol of the corporate lawyer during the 
1920s, "diligently ... reiterated his pride that he was 'born and raised a country lawyer, and 
a country lawyer, I suppose, I shall remain. " ' AUERBACH , supra note 87, at 137 (quoting John 
W. Davis). 
214. See generally PAUL A. WOLKIN, ALI-ABA XL! (1988) (discussing the history of 
continuing legal education efforts of the American Law Institute and American Bar Association). 
215 . Professional Announcements, 19 N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N . BULL. 152, 153 (1947). 
216 . Swaine, supra note 81. 
217 . The U.S. Bar, FORTUNE, May 1949, at 90, 172. 
218. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 75 A.B.A. REP. 102, 122-23. 
219. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 76 A.B.A. REP. 107, 123-24 (1951). 
220. ld. at 124. The special committee which made the recommendation to the House of 
Delegates relied largely on the history of such usages by admiralty and patent lawyers, dating 
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Association Journal examining the organization of a lawyer's practice 
suggested the necessity of specialization in all but the smallest offices in the 
smallest towns. 221 In his President's Page column in the February 1953 
issue of the Journal, Robert G. Storey announced the creation of a special 
committee to advise the Board of Governors whether it should prescribe 
minimum standards of education and experience to practice as a specialist. 
Storey wrote: 
The legal profession has not kept pace with the rapidly changing events 
and demands of our time. Admission to the Bar is a license to a lawyer 
to perform almost any legal operation that an unsuspecting client may 
invite. The neophyte lawyer is automatically certified as competent to 
advise a corporation on its tax liabilities, to draw oil unitization agree-
ments, and to negotiate consent decrees in antitrust suits. 
In thus providing for continuing legal education, the Bar and the law 
school co-operating in the project do more than benefit lawyers who have 
an ambition for greater knowledge . They benefit principally the public in 
that the lawyers to whom problems are taken in special fields have 
superior competence. As these specialists develop in the law, they are 
being recognized by lawyers and by the public, and, to an increasing 
extent, technical problems will be referred to technical legal experts for 
solution. 222 
The next year, the Special Committee on Specialization and Specialized 
Legal Education recommended that the ABA create a permanent committee to 
regulate specialization. The permanent committee would "encourage the 
formation of groups of lawyer specialists in the approved fields of specializa-
tion. "223 The Committee also recommended amending Canon 46 to permit 
lawyers to send to other lawyers a brief, dignified notice of membership in a 
specialty group.224 At the ABA's 1954 Mid-year Meeting, the House of 
Delegates refused to adopt the Committee's recommendations and substituted 
vaguely worded recommendations supporting some form of regulation of 
specialization and delegating the task to the Board of Governors. 225 A 
back to before the adoption of the Canons of Ethics. See Report of the Special Committee to 
Study the Matter of Amendment to Canon 27, 76 A.B.A. REP. 437, 438 (1951). 
221. See Gerhart, supra note 50, at 730-31. 
222. Robert G. Storey, The President's Page, 39 A.B.A. J. 91, 91, 158 (1953). 
223. Special Committee on Specialization and Specialized Legal Education, 79 A.B.A. REP. 
582, 583 (1954). 
224. See id. 
225. The recommendations were: 
1. That the American Bar Association approves in principle the necessity to 
regulate voluntary specialization in the various fields of the practice of the law for the 
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subcommittee of the Board of Governors proposed creation of "The Council 
of Legal Specialists," which would have the exclusive authority both to 
establish fields of specialization and to regulate any "Society" of legal 
specialists organized within those fields. 226 Opposition to this proposal led 
to withdrawal of the recommendation pending an October 14, 1954 meeting 
of the Board of Governors. 227 At that meeting, speakers overwhelmingly 
opposed the proposal of the Board of Governors, and the Board decided to 
defer any action. 228 
The most thorough response to the Board's proposal, a statement by the 
ABA's Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, was published in 
Unauthorized Practice News. The Committee based its opposition to estab-
lished fields of specialization on the traditional understanding of professional-
ism. One professionalism argument focused on the difference between the 
profession of law and the pursuit of business: "[T]he proposal is concerned 
more with labels and with the obtaining of clients than with the establishment 
of standards to be enforced by appropriate sanctions. "229 The Committee 
added: 
[T)he proposal is more than likely to result in the creation of a number of 
"splinter groups" of lawyers whose activities will not bear so much on the 
policing of the field as on the exchange of information and the obtaining 
of clients . The so-called "Societies" are more apt to be like trade associa-
tions or craft unions than like the true professional societies needed for the 
purpose. 230 
This, the Committee believed, would lower "the standards of the entire 
protection of the public and the bar, and 
2. That the American Bar Association approves the principle that in order to 
entitle a lawyer to recognition as a specialist in a particular field he should meet 
certain standards of experience and education, and 
3. That the implementation, organization, and financing of [a] plan of 
regulation to carry out such principles is delegated to the Board of Governors, subject 
to final approval by the House of Delegates. 
Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 79 A.B.A. REP. 447, 450 (1954). 
226. See Report of Subcommittee of the Board of Governors Implementing the Recommenda-
tions of the Special Committee on Specialization and Specialized Legal Education, 79 A.B.A. 
REP. 403, 403 (1954). 
227. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 79 A.B.A. REP. 115, 137 (1954) . 
228. Editor's Note, 42 A.B.A. J . 610, 610-11 (1956) . 
229. Statement of Committee on Unauthorized Practice of lAw on Specialization and 
Specialized Legal Education, UNAUTHORIZED PRAC. NEWS, Dec. 1954, at 4, 5 [hereinafter 
Unauthorized Practice Committee Statement] . 
230. Id. 
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profession. "231 
The second professionalism argument relied on the older understanding 
of law and lawyers. The Committee asserted, "[T]he law is a seamless web; 
. . . it cannot be divided into separate compartments; and . . . a general 
knowledge of and proficiency in the law is required for its successful practice 
in all fields . "232 The Committee then predicted that the proposal would be 
"particularly offensive to the country lawyer" :233 
The country lawyer is of necessity a general practitioner. . . . [Country 
lawyers] are proud of the fact that they are lawyers, in the traditional sense 
of the term, and not specialists and they will resent the Association's 
recognition and approval of this newly created and self appointed class of 
experts within the profession. 234 
Even so, a number of commentators claimed that the era of legal 
specialization was at hand. As in the 1930s, most of these commentators were 
legal academics or elite corporate lawyers. In 1954, in celebration of its 200th 
anniversary, Columbia University sponsored a symposium on the topic of The 
Metropolis in Modem Life.23s The subsequently published collection of 
articles generated by the symposium included a study of the impact of the 
large city on the professions. Two commentators on this study were Reginald 
Heber Smith, 236 at that time Director of the Survey on the Legal Profession, 
and Columbia University Law School Professor Harry Jones. 237 Smith 
believed that the professional practice of law could be maintained only by 
specialization, due to the law's "[b]ulk and complexity. "238 The dilemma 
lay in maintaining a proper lawyer-client relationship. The solution, according 
to Smith, was to organize the practice of law in partnerships of legal special-
ists.239 Jones agreed, noting, "[I]t is likely that an effort to achieve effective 
cooperation among specialists offers more promise than any attempt to tum the 
231. ld. at 6 . 
232. ld. at 8 . About the "seamless web" the English legal historian Frederic W. Maitland 
once wrote: "Such is the unity of all history that any one who endeavors to tell a piece of it must 
feel that his first sentence tears a seamless web." Frederic W. Maitland, A Prologue to a History 
of English Law, 14 L .Q. REv. 13 (1898). 
233 . Unauthorized Practice Committee Statement, supra note 229, at 8. 
234. /d. 
235 . See THE METROPOLIS IN MODERN LIFE vii (Robert M. Fisher ed ., 1955). 
236 . See Reginald H . Smith, Commentary , in THE METROPOLIS IN MODERN LIFE, supra note 
235, at 307. 
237. See Harry W. Jones, Commentary, in THE METROPOLIS IN MODERN LIFE, supra note 
235, at 312. 
238. Smith , supra note 236, at 309. 
239 . ld. 
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clock back from specialization. " 240 All that was necessary was for legal 
educators to ensure that the specialist was provided an education broad enough 
to allow the specialist to recognize "interdisciplinary" problems.241 Two 
years earlier, a Washington lawyer named Charles Horsky delivered a series 
of lectures at Northwestern University concerning The Washington Law-
yer. 242 After explaining the work of the Washington lawyer before adminis-
trative agencies and independent commissions, in Congress, and before special 
courts like the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Horsky concluded: 
"Almost every Washington lawyer is a specialist. "243 
Two members of the ABA's Special Committee on Specialization and 
Specialized Legal Education refused to let die the issue of formal recognition 
of specialization. In the December 1955 issue of the American Bar Associa-
tion Journal, the Chairman of the Special Committee, University of Michigan 
Law School Professor Charles Joiner, raised the stakes of the debate by 
arguing that the legal profession would either control specialization and 
prosper from it, or fail to do so and be destroyed by it.244 In an appeal to 
both the professional and economic interests of lawyers, Joiner suggested that 
"[i]naction at the present time will be equal to a vote for the uncontrolled 
splitting of the profession and its organization into separate warring groups 
competing for clients. "245 In Joiner's view, the only way to prevent frag-
mentation of the legal profession was to acknowledge and regulate legal 
specialization. Further, Joiner felt that regulation was necessary to prevent the 
problem of the "in-looking" specialist, who interpreted everything in terms of 
the particular specialty. 246 
Another member of the Special Committee, a seventy-year-old elite 
240. Jones, supra note 237, at 312. 
241. ld. at 313 . 
242. CHARLES A. HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER (1952). Horsky was a long-time 
lawyer at Covington & Burling. See JOSEPH C. GoULDEN, THE SUPERLAWYERS: THE SMALL 
AND POWERFUL WORLD OF THE GREAT WASHINGTON LAW FIRMS 28-31 (1972). 
243. HORSKY, supra note 242, at 161; accord GoULDEN, supra note 242, at 16 ("Washington 
Law is highly specialized, and highly fragmented . .. . "). 
244. See Charles W. Joiner, Specialization in the Law: Control It or It Will Destroy the 
Profession,41 A.B.A. I . 1105, 1105 (1955) [hereinafter Joiner, Controllt]. Other, less extreme, 
commentaries touting the need for controlled specialization were Charles W. I oiner, Specializa-
tion in the Law? The Medical Profession Shows the Way, 39 A.B.A. I. 539 (1953); Carl G. 
Paffendorf, Comment, Legal Specialization-Why The Objections?, 12 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229, 
230 (1958) (concluding that benefits of controlled legal specialization included "a more learned 
and proficient crop of attorneys" and "the satisfaction of a great public need"); and Henry S. 
Drinker, Legal Specialists: Specialized Legal Service, 41 A.B.A. I . 690 (1955). 
245. Joiner, Control It, supra note 244, at 1105. 
246 . I d. at 1170. I oiner tied this argument to the case against unauthorized practice of law. 
Without regulation of specialization, Joiner claimed, "those interested in the prevention of 
unauthorized practice will have little ammunition." I d. 
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lawyer named Harrison Tweed247 gave the Fourteenth Annual Benjamin N. 
Cardozo lecture. 248 Tweed was a founding partner in the white-shoe New 
York City finn of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy and was an expert 
in estates and trusts . Tweed's father spent most of his legal career as a 
railroad lawyer, working as general counsel to the Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway Company and the Southern Pacific Company. His maternal 
grandfather was William M. Evarts, the famous New York trial lawyer of the 
mid-to-late nineteenth century. Tweed was a prominent advocate of legal aid 
and was thrice President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York, the oldest bar organization in continuous existence. 249 
Tweed's lecture was titled The Changing Practice of Law." Tweed' s 
concern was not with lawyers in large finns, who he believed adequately 
performed their work, but with lawyers practicing alone. 250 Tweed suggest-
ed that the opponents of legal specialization were holding onto the false 
premises of the ideal of the omnicompetent lawyer and the seamless web of the 
law. Although a lawyer in the past might have been able to know all of the 
law, the complexity of modem life and law made that a practical impossibility. 
Even the most knowledgeable lawyer knew just part of the law. Consequent-
ly, the lawyer necessarily specialized to practice law professionally. 251 At 
a time when accountants/tax preparers and others began to use their specialized 
expertise to take work from lawyers, 252 the only ethical response was for 
lawyers to specialize as well. If bar associations attempted to assert a 
monopoly for lawyers in all tax work by charging accountants with the 
unauthorized practice of law, lawyers would be engaged in trade union-like 
protectionism at its worst. 253 
247 . On Tweed, see generally Roger K. Newman, Harrison Tweed, in DICTIONARY OF 
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY: SUPPLEMENT EIGHT 1966-70, at 662 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. 
Carnes eds . , 1988). 
248 . The lecture was given in late October 1955 to the members of the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York and was published as TwEED, supra note 88 . 
249 . Tweed's grandfather William Evarts was the first president of the Association. See 
GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 51, at 23 . 
250. See TwEED, supra note 88, at 15-17. 
251. Tweed observed: 
Many lawyers have learned that most clients require a proficiency which the 
lawyer cannot give if he has spread his education and reading and experience over the 
entire legal territory . In order first to have clients and then to be able to conscien-
tiously handle their legal problems, a proficiency is necessary which can be acquired 
only by a certain amount of specialization. 
ld. at 17. 
252 . The intrusion by accountants and others into the work of the lawyer was noted by Fortune 
in its May 1949 portrait of the profession, see The U.S. Bar, supra note 217, at 174-76, and was 
the subject of a student-written note in the mid-1950s, see Note, The Practice of Taxes as the 
Practice of Law: The Lawyer-Accountant Dispute, 39 MINN. L . REv. 873 (1955) . 
253. See TwEED, supra note 88, at 11 & n.12. 
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The claim that specialization was necessary was made to a profession in 
which two-thirds of its 177,000 members in private practice were sole 
practitioners. 2S4 Although both professionalism and economic arguments 
were made in favor of formal recognition of specialization, the easier 
argument was the economic argument. Empirical data showed that the larger 
the law firm (and thus, it was claimed, the greater the legal specialization), the 
greater the income of the lawyer. Blaustein and Porter reported that sole 
practitioners earned less than one-fifth the annual incomes of lawyers in firms 
of nine or more members2Ss and that pairs of lawyers who worked as 
partners earned fifty percent more than sole practitioners. 2S6 
The professionalism argument was more difficult. One classic justifica-
tion of the lawyer as professional was his knowledge of law. Addressing this 
issue, one advocate of specialization acknowledged, "Abraham Lincoln could 
practice law in the frontier community of which he was a part without special 
competence in any field but with a general facility which enabled him to 
handle all types of cases in an acceptable manner. "2S7 For specialization to 
succeed, this vision of the ideal lawyer had to be turned on its head. Joiner, 
Tweed, and other proponents of specialization claimed that modem life (read 
"progress") demanded that lawyers recognize that professional competence 
required them to limit their practices. The difficult proposition was to 
convince lawyers that specialization suited the ideology of the profession of 
law. 
The intensity of the effort by corporate lawyers (and their friends) to 
connect specialization with professionalism is clearly illustrated by two books 
published shortly after Tweed's and Joiner's pleas went unheeded. Arthur H. 
Dean, a partner in the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, wrote a biography 
254. See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES 0 . PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: A 
SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 8 (1954). 
255. /d. at 11 tbl. 2 (noting that a 1948 study by the Department of Commerce found that the 
average income of sole practitioners was $5,759, that the average income of an attorney in a firm 
consisting of nine or more members was $27,246, and that comparable median figures were 
$4,275 and $21,500, respectively). 
256 . Id. This was also true when calculated either as an average or as a median. 
257. Charles B. Nutting, Training Lawyers for the Future, Address at the Dedication of the 
New Building of the Hastings College of Law (Mar. 26, 1953), in 6 I. LEGAL Eouc. 1, 7 
(1953) . Nutting was not defending the classic position, for he also said, "One of my theories 
about practice is that it is becoming more and more specialized. Although we still tend to think 
of the general practitioner, of whom the country lawyer is the prototype, as being typical of our 
calling, it is quite evident that he is passing from the scene just as the family doctor is vanishing 
into the realm of legend." /d. Most of Nutting's speech was later reprinted in the American Bar 
Association Journal. See Charles B. Nutting, Training Lawyers for the Future: Some Theories 
About the Practice of Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Building of the Hastings 
College of Law (Mar. 26, 1953), in 41 A.B.A. I. 607 (1955). 
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of founding \)artner William Dean Cromwell privately published in 1957.258 
Several years later, lawyer and legal scholar Beryl Harold Levy~9 wrote a 
book titled Corporation Lawyer: Saint or Sinner?. 260 The rehabilitation--
indeed, veneration-of the corporate lawyer permeates both books. 
According to Dean, Cromwell was unlike the "trial lawyer-politician-
statesman-orator-classicist," but was more suited to the Gilded Age.261 
Cromwell possessed a "flair for figures, [a] passion for facts and more facts, 
and [an] insistence on realistic, economic analysis rather than polished 
rhetoric, literary allusion or poetical quotation, "262 the strengths of the trial 
lawyer. Not only was this new breed of attorney a "hard-headed business 
counsellor[]," but he also enjoyed the "creative imagination ... to devise new 
legal forms. "263 Dean's biography of Cromwell portrayed the work of the 
office lawyer as the highest and best use of the intelligent lawyer's abilities. 
In other words, the shift of the professional elite from the trial lawyer to the 
office lawyer was made not for monetary reasons, but for reasons of intellect, 
or knowledge. 264 
Dean's biography of Cromwell takes a curious tum near its middle. In 
a twelve-page digression, Dean discussed the nature of the practice of law in 
the large law firm. 26s More particularly, he tried to dispel the charge that 
specialization had adversely affected the profession of law. Criticizing Justice 
Stone's 1934 speech at the dedication of the University of Michigan Law 
258. DEAN, supra note 46. 
259. Levy has recently written an illuminating sketch of his own life and work. See BERYL 
H. LEVY, ANGLO-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS DEVELOPMENT 
AND OUTCOME xv-xxiii (1991). 
260. LEVY, supra note 46. 
261. DEAN, supra note 46, at 52. 
262. ld. 
263 . ld. at 53. 
264. A similar argument. was made by a New York and Virgin Islands lawyer named Roger 
Siddall, whom Tweed cited with approval: 
The practice of law is an art, in many instances a high art, and as with . . . many 
other artistic pursuits the best results are obtained where there is a substantial divorce 
between the activity of the pursuit itself and the objective of obtaining monetary 
compensation. 
That this is an impractical ideal and pretty much a visionary conception in the 
practice of a small office I agree but in a large office things can be different and the 
ideal can come closer to achievement. I have seen it with my own eyes and I know 
it can happen . 
ROGER B. SIDDALL, A SURVEY OF LARGE LAW FIRMS IN THE UNITED STATES 132, quoted in 
TwEED, supra note 88, at 51-52 n.l9. 
Siddall later voiced in the American Bar Association Journal his disdain for the call for 
acknowledgment and regulation of legal specialization. See Roger B. Siddall, Specialization in 
the Law: A Retort to Professor Joiner's Call for Control, 42 A.B.A. I. 625 (1956). 
265. See DEAN, supra note 46, at 76-87. 
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Quadrangle,266 Dean argued that "in [Stone's] widely shared fear there is 
some of the deceptive plausibility of the half truth. "267 Like Reginald Heber 
Smith and Harrison Tweed, Dean concluded that the cause of specialization 
was the increasing complexity of society, not the rise of the large firm. The 
lawyer's intelligent contemporaries in business accepted the lawyer's counsel 
only if it was based on expert knowledge, and that expert knowledge was 
found in the large law firm, just as in the past it was once found in the sole 
practitioner. Using the offering of Ford Motor Company stock by the Ford 
Foundation as an example, Dean concluded: 
A considerable amount of close cooperation between specialists in a 
number of fields, and therefore of practice in partnership, is simply 
unavoidable if today's commerce is to receive the competent advice 
required to permit its nationwide and frequently worldwide scope of 
operati_ons to continue on the unrelenting and exacting time tables now 
customary in financial matters.268 
Returning to Cromwell, Dean suggested that Cromwell epitomized the 
true legal professional: 
Cromwell never forgot that he was first and foremost an "officer of the 
court," a professional man. . .. He had a high standard of ethics and lived 
up to his code. He fought hard on behalf of his clients. But he never 
thought that his duty to his clients, which he placed very high, required 
him to forego his duty to his country or his duty to the courts, or, indeed, 
to society. 269 
As an officer of the court and conscious of his duty to society, Cromwell was 
the modem embodiment of the lawyer as professional, and a worthy historical 
heir to Abraham Lincoln, the personification of the country lawyer. 
Levy's book offers many of the same judgments found in Dean's 
biography. 27° For Levy, like Dean, the story was straightforwardly instru-
mental: Before 1870, life and the economy in America were simpler. The 
266. See supra text accompanying notes 198-201. 
267. ld. at 81. 
268. ld. at 85 . Then, like many others before and after him, see, e.g., GLENN GREENWOOD 
& ROBERT F. FREDERICKSON, SPECIALIZATION IN THE MEDICAL AND LEGAL PROFESSIONS 
(1964), Dean analogized the specialization of legal practice to specialization in the medical 
profession, see DEAN, supra note 46, at 85. 
269. DEAN, supra note 46, at 167. 
270. For example, much of Chapter 9 of Corporation lAwyer, titled Cromwell: The 
Institutional Firm, is taken almost directly from Dean. Compare LEVY, supra note 46, at 51-69 
with DEAN, supra note 46. 
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industrial revolution gave birth to the "Office Corporation Lawyer"271 and 
caused the death of the courtroom lawyer, for the court room was inefficient, 
cumbersome, and creaky. 272 Levy wrote, "[T]he typically big-league lawyer 
today is a partner in a large law office of specialists in various phases of 
corporate and financial law. "273 He felt that although large law firms were 
indeed "factories," with a "high degree of division of labor and specializa-
tion, "274 lawyers in such firms should not feel guilty, for they were true 
exemplars of the "bar's best tradition. "275 Again like Dean, Levy cited 
Justice Stone's excoriation of the profession,276 but reminded his readers that 
lawyers were "supported and strengthened by the persisting tradition of an 
independent bar," whose members remained officers of the court.277 To 
Levy, it was wrong for lawyers "to cling to the idea of an omnicompetent 
lawyer" and to reject "special certificates for legal specialists. "278 Just as 
in the medical profession, the "necessity for specialization" existed in the legal 
profession. 279 
In the 1960s, the ABA twice renewed its efforts to formally recognize 
legal specialization. In 1961 the Board of Governors created a new Special 
Committee on Recognition and Regulation of Specialization in Law Prac-
tice. 280 The Special Committee in 1962 presented to the House of Delegates 
a much more modest proposal than the 1954 Special Committee's. 281 Even 
this more modest plan to formally certify lawyers was opposed by lawyers 
outside the elite of the bar. 282 What is most interesting about the opposition 
271. LEVY, supra note 46, at 22. 
272. ld. at 24-25. 
273. Id. at 25 . 
274. ld. at 38. 
275 . ld. at 85. 
276. ld. at 169-71. 
277. ld. at 173. 
278. See id. at 154. 
279 . ld. 
280. See Report of the Board of Governors, 81 A.B.A. REP. 54 (1962). Two members of the 
Committee were Charles Joiner and Harrison Tweed . Special Committees of the Association, 81 
A.B.A. REP. 44, 54 (1962) . 
281. See Proceedings of the 1962 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 48 A.B.A. I . 
353, 362-63 (1962); John C. Satterfield, The President's Page, 48 A.B.A. I. 3 (1962). Instead 
of creating a Council of Legal Specialists and urging the creation of specialized legal societies, 
the 1962 proposal suggested the undertaking of minimal work to obtain a "certificate of 
proficiency" administered by an ABA Council on Certification with the advice and counsel of the 
various sections of the ABA. A certificate of proficiency would not limit the holder's ability to 
practice in other areas . See Proceedings of the 1962 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 
supra, at 362-63 . 
282. See Specialization Proves Spicy Subject, 19 I. Mo. BAR 202 (1963) (reprinting article in 
LAW. Ass'N KAN. CITY NEWSL.) (reponing vote in opposition to the ABA's proposal by the 
Lawyers Association of Kansas City); Majority Oppose Specialization Certification, N.J. L.J. , 
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is the change in its reasons for opposing formal recognition of specialization. 
Instead of challenging the proposal by extolling the virtues of the country 
lawyer83 and the seamless web of the law, opponents conceded the existence 
and inevitability of legal specialization. 284 They premised their opposition 
primarily on the economic and professional consequences of the segmentation 
of the profession and secondarily on the limited judgment of specialists. 285 
A year later, after hearing so much opposition, the Committee concluded: 
"[T]he bar of the country either does not want specialization controlled or is 
not prepared to accept regulation at this time. "286 
The debate between proponents and opponents of formal recognition of 
legal specialization was a staple of legal periodicals during the rest of the 
Nov. 22, 1962, at 1 (noting opposition of New Jersey State Bar Association to ABA proposal). 
283 . The only "country lawyer" argument made in the two debates cited in note 282, supra, 
was the argument of Dean Frederick D. Lewis of the University of Kansas City Law School that 
country lawyers might resent specialists because their work might not qualify them as specialists. 
See Specialization Proves Spicy Subject, supra note 282, at 203. One member of the ABA 
Special Committee, Arch Cantrall, a self-styled "country lawyer," claimed that appellation in 
arguing in favor of the Committee's proposal, although he was once Chief Counsel of the Internal 
Revenue Service under President Eisenhower. See Arch M. Cantrall, A Country Lawyer Looks 
at "Specialization", 48 A.B.A. I. 1117 (1962). 
284. See Russell D. Niles, Ethical Prerequisites to Certification of Special Proficiency, 49 
A.B.A. I. 83 (1963) (beginning opposition to proposal by stating: "It is not the purpose of this 
article to challenge the desirability, the necessity or even the inevitability of specialization in the 
legal profession."); Specialization Proves Spicy Subject, supra note 282, at 203; ABA 
Certification of "Special Proficiency": Contra-Another Primrose Path, N .I. L.J., Nov . 8, 1962, 
at 4 (beginning opposition to ABA proposal with the statement: "Specialization in legal practice 
is a fact. "). As Dean of New York University Law School, Niles made a similar statement in 
the school's Bulletin in another argument against the ABA's proposal. See Russell D. Niles, 
Specialization v. General Education, 2 N.Y.U. L. CENTER BULL. 2 (Winter 1962) ("[C]lients 
realize that specialization is important, because of the complexity of the law .... ") . 
285 . See Specialization Proves Spicy Subject, supra note 282, at 203 (noting that Frederick 
Lewis opposed certification proposal on grounds that "he was not convinced that specialists were 
equipped to handle general legal problems alone" and that "the public image of the lawyer as a 
man who could look at and analyze a legal problem would be changed to a man who could look 
at only certain types of legal problems"); ABA Certification of "Special Proficiency": 
Contra-Another Primrose Path, supra note 284, at 4 (noting problems of "professional myopia" 
and the eclipse of professional control "by the self constituted 'colleges' of specialists," and 
worrying that specialization would succeed "to the detriment of the larger perspective of the 
general practitioner and his freedom from the specialist's pre-commitment to find a solution 
within the fenced boundaries of his own domain") . 
Professor Joiner anticipated these arguments in Joiner, Control It, supra note i44, at 1108, 
1170, but without apparent effect. Professor Richard Hams berger also suggested that because 
approved law lists recognized legal specialists, the problem of fragmentation already existed. See 
RichardS. Harnsberger, Publication of Specialties and Legal Ability Ratings in Law Lists, 49 
A.B.A. I . 33 (1963). 
286. Report of the Special Committee on Recognition and Regulation of Specialization in Law 
Practice, 88 A.B.A. REP. 672, 672 (1963). 
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decade. Proponents continued to argue that because legal specialization was 
a fact of lawyerly life, competent lawyers were those who limited their 
practice, and that efficient use of legal services often required the use of 
lawyers with particular expertise in the law. 287 Some opponents abandoned 
the traditional claim of the professional lawyer's knowledge of all of law, 
arguing instead that specialists lacked the judgment to properly serve the 
public role designed for lawyers by our political system.288 
In the late 1960s, the ABA made one more effort to deal with the 
problem of specialization. The result was another setback for proponents of 
formal recognition of specialists. In 1965, the ABA Board of Governors 
created a Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services to study and 
make recommendations concerning the adequacy and availability of legal 
services. 289 In 1967, the Special Committee concluded: "Recognition and 
regulation of specialization in the practice of law will measurably improve the 
availability of legal services to those who should be in need of them. "290 
The Special Committee recommended that the House of Delegates request the 
Board of Governors to "further consider the matter of recognition and 
regulation of voluntary specialists in the various fields of the practice of law 
for the benefit and protection of the public and of the Bar. "291 Although the 
Board of Governors amended the Special Committee's recommendation so that 
the House of Delegates would instead request the Board to renew its efforts to 
implement the ABA's 1954 resolutions,292 the House of Delegates refused 
to vote in principle in favor of this recommendation and placed the issue back 
before the Board of Governors, 293 which created the Special Committee on 
287 . See BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN, SPECIALIZATION 3 (tent. draft 1967) ("There is little room 
for doubt that specialists can provide legal services superior in quality to those performed by 
generalists."); John P. Bracken, Specialization in the Law: A Fact and Not a Theory, 53 A.B.A. 
I. 325 (1967); Elliott E. Cheatham, The Growing Need for Specialized Services, 16 VAND. L. 
REv. 497 (1963); Gary N. Hagerman, Comment, Legal Effects of Attorney Specialization, 30 
ALB. L. REv. 282 (1966); Elwin A. Andrus, Legal Specialization, WIS. B. BULL., Aug. 1969, 
at 9 . 
288. See, e.g., Willard H. Pedrick, Collapsible Specialists, 55 A.B.A. I . 324, 324-25 (1969) . 
289. See Report of the Board of Governors, 90 A.B.A. REP. 364, 365 (1965). 
290. Supplemental Report of the Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services: Report 
on Specialization, 92 A.B.A. REP. 584, 584 (1967) [hereinafter Report on Specialization]; accord 
Chesterfield H. Smith, Increased Availability of Legal Services Through Specialization, Address 
at the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Aug. 6, 1966), in 40 FLA. B.I. 1219 (1966). 
Smith, later a President of the ABA, also served as Chairman of the Special Committee on 
Specialization. 
291. See Report on Specialization, supra note 290, at 584. 
292. SeeSupplementalReportoftheBoard of Governors, 92 A.B.A. REP. 372, 372-73 (1967) . 
293 . See Proceedings of the House of Delegates at the 1967 Annual Meeting, 92 A.B.A. REP. 
316, 336-38 (1967). 
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Specialization. 294 After two years of study, the Special Committee on 
Specialization concluded in 1969 that the ABA should not promulgate a 
national plan of specialization until learning from experimental specialization 
programs conducted at the state and local level. 29S 
D. The End of the Beginning: 1970-Present 
The ABA's role since 1970 has been to strengthen the efforts of states to 
implement specialization programs. Through promulgating the Model Code 
of Professional Responsibility and Model Rules of Professional Conduct, by 
acting as a clearinghouse for information, and in creating a model special-
ization certification plan for states to adopt, the ABA has continued to view 
formal recognition of legal specialization as central to its mission to represent 
of the views of the bar. One consequence of the ABA' s efforts is the 
insistence by current leaders of the bar elite that specialization defines the 
lawyer as a professional. 
California, in 1973,296 and Texas, in 1974,297 were the first two states 
to create programs certifying lawyers as specialists. These pilot programs 
each selected three fields for certification, fields of law in which the nonelite 
lawyer practiced. California chose workmen's compensation, criminal law, 
and taxation. 298 Texas chose the fields of family law, criminal law, and 
labor law. 299 
Both programs were premised on the assumption that certification of 
specialists protected the public interest by ensuring the competence of 
lawyers. 300 The image of the competent lawyer, just as Tweed had envi-
294. See Report of the Board of Governors , 93 A.B.A. REP. 136, 141-42 (1968) . 
295. See Proceedings of the 1969 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 94 A.B.A. REP. 
115, 129-32 (1969) . 
296. See Standards for Specialization Announced, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 80 (1973) . The Ninth 
Circuit in 1976 rejected a constitutional challenge to the California plan. See Brady v. State Bar, 
533 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1976). In 1982, California made its pilot program permanent. See Board 
Adopts Permanent Specialization Program, CAL. LAW., May 1982, at 43, 43-44. For back-
ground on the California plan, see generally Comm. on Specialization, State Bar of Cal. , Final 
Report, 44 J . ST. B. CAL. 493 (1969) [hereinafter Specialization Committee Report] . 
297. Richard Wells, Certification in Texas: lncreasing Lawyer Competence and Aiding the 
Public in Lawyer Selection , 30 BAYLOR L. REv . 689, 689 n.1 (1978). Wells was Executive 
Director of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. 
298. See Specialization Committee Report, supra note 296 , at 511 . 
299. Wells, supra note 297, at 691. 
300. Compare Specialization Committee Report, supra note 296, at 500 (concluding that "an 
increase in the number of competent specialists will improve the overall quality of the legal 
services rendered by lawyers to clients because specialists can maximize both their experience 
and their continuing legal education"); with Wells, supra note 297, at 689-90 ("The twin goals 
of the certification specialization programs are : (1) to increase lawyer competency through 
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sioned, 301 was not the lawyer who claimed to know all of law, but the 
lawyer whose knowledge was limited to specific areas of law. 302 As the 
Committee on Specialization of the State Bar of California stated: "Some 
degree of specialization is a necessity of modem law practice. The law that 
applies to our complex society is such that no single lawyer can perform all 
legal tasks required .... Thus, the 'seamless web' analogy may have to be 
abandoned, or at least modified. "303 
More generally, proponents of certification specialization programs 
reversed the argument that formal recognition of specialization would cause 
the fragmentation of the profession. Instead of specialization's causing 
fragmentation, the failure to formally recognize specialization would cause 
those lawyers already specializing in particular fields to develop "narrow and 
autonomous self-policing units. "304 Such a result would benefit neither the 
profession nor the public. A related threat to the unity of the legal profession, 
but especially to the general practitioner, was the growth of group legal 
continuing legal education, testing, peer review, and involvement in the field, and (2) to inform 
the public who the specially competent attorneys are in the particular field of law in which legal 
assistance is sought."). 
This was the same reason used by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his quest to certify trial 
lawyers. See Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and 
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973). 
But see MichaelS. Ariens, A Uniform Rule Governing the Admission and Practice of Attorneys 
Before United States District Courts, 35 DEPAUL L. REv. 649 (1986), in which I noted that 
empirical data on the incompetence of trial lawyers was lacking and proposed a uniform rule 
through which lawyers would be qualified to practice before all United States district courts . 
301. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
302. "If the assumption of omnicompetence is no longer valid-and there can no longer be any 
real doubt that it is not-why do lawyers continue to cling to it so tenaciously?" CHRISTENSEN, 
supra note 287, at 17. See also id. at 13-18. Proponents of bar-regulated plans of specialization 
regularly cited surveys indicating that lawyers viewed themselves as specialists. See, e.g., David 
R. Brink, Specialization: A Changing Climate, in A MATTER OF COMPETENCE: MANDATORY 
CLE AND SPECIALIZATION 26, 32-33 (1979). 
303. Specialization Committee Report, supra note 296, at 499-500. Others agreed. See, e.g., 
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 287, at 18 ("Finally, and perhaps most importantly, lawyers may be 
loath to abandon the pose of omnicompetence in favor of specialization because of what 
specialization suggests about the law itself. First, and most obviously, it suggests that the 
'seamless web' analogy might have to be abandoned, or at least modified. If specialization is 
possible and desirable, then clearly the law does have some seams."); cf. Stanley B. Kent, 
Problems of Specialization, 7 L. OFF. EcoN. & MGMT. 385, 388 (1967) ("Specialization does 
not challenge the seamless web concept and fully recognizes the indivisibility of the law. At the 
same time, it is possible to mark out a certain specific area within the web, enumerate the skills 
it particularly demands, and require, for accreditation, evidence of mastery of these skills.") . 
304. Specialization Committee Report, supra note 296, at 501; accord Brink, supra note 302, 
at 41; Smith, supra note 290, at 1224. The same argument was made in 1955 in Joiner, Control 
It, supra note 244, at 1105. 
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services. 305 
During this time, the attack on formal legal specialization was based not 
on protecting the ideal of the country lawyer, but on economic grounds. · In 
several articles, Marvin Mindes, a lawyer and sociologist, attacked formal 
specialization programs as attempts by the legal profession to increase its 
members ' incomes by giving them the opportunity to claim greater status as 
experts. 306 Antitrust attorney Jerome Hochberg made the same argument in 
a book edited by Ralph Nader and Mark Green: 
Specialization, certification, [continuing legal education] and tii.al advocacy 
licensing all have a certain plausibility. They can assure clients that the 
lawyers who serve them have been trained and approved for the task. 
They can lead to greater lawyer efficiency, which in turn can result in cost 
savings passed on to clients . So much for theory. In fact, these programs 
construct new and formidable barriers to free and open competition in the 
market for legal services . They reduce the supply of lawyers in critical 
areas, which will, if the medical specialties provide any analogy, lead to 
higher fees charged, not lower ones .307 
Because both critics and proponents were operating without the benefit of 
any empirical data, the response to the charge of rent seeking was the 
following syllogism: Specialization resulted in enhanced lawyer competence 
and greater facility with the particular law involved; knowing the law meant 
less time (and, thus, money) was spent on the legal problem; and therefore, 
specialization led to greater savings, not higher costs, for clients. 
The two traditional arguments against legal specialization were based on 
knowledge and independence. The first argument was made only in a diluted 
fashion after the 1950s; the second argument disappeared during the 1970s. 
Specialists were no longer damned for their inward-looking or narrow-minded 
tendencies. Instead, specialization was equated with the issue of access: the 
value of specialists was premised on their public duty to provide access to 
prospective "consumers" then excluded from lawyering services. 308 The use 
of specialists to serve this public function provided the answer to claims that 
advertising of specialties might somehow compromise the independence of 
305 . See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 287, at 21. 
306. See Marvin W. Mindes, Lawyer Specialty Certification: The Monopoly Game, 61 A. B.A. 
J . 42 (1975); Marvin W. Mindes, Proliferation, Specialization and Certification: The Splitting 
of the Bar, 11 U. TOL. L. REv . 273 (1980) . 
307. Jerome Hochberg , The Drive to Specialization , in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 118, 121 
(Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds ., 1976); accord Nicholas von Hoffman, Specialization: Raising 
the Standards-and the Prices, WASH . POST, Jan. 1, 1975, at Cl. 
308. Lester Brickman, Legal Specialization: An Oller~~iew of Goals and Ethical Considerations, 
in LEGAL SPECIALIZATION 5, 11-19 (1976). 
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lawyers. In this way, the specialist replaced the independent country lawyer. 
The biggest development concerning efforts to promote specialization 
plans was the Supreme Court's holding in Bates v. State Bar'09 that lawyer 
advertising, if neither false nor misleading, is entitled to at least some First 
Amendment protection. One immediate response to Bates was an amendment 
to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 310 In 1977, the ABA 
amended Disciplinary Rule 2-105 of the Model Code. 311 A second response 
was to use the Bates decision to implement the new definition of the 
professional lawyer. 
The constitutionally guaranteed right of lawyers practicing in legal clinics 
to advertise their services would not affect the large-firm lawyer; instead, 
Bates, as applied to "routine" legal services, 312 offered clinics the opportuni-
ty to engage in unfair competition against the nonelite lawyer. Because the 
"false and misleading" limitation of the right to engage in commercial speech 
309. 433 u.s. 350 (1977). 
310. The ABA adopted the Model Code in 1969 as the successor to the Canons of Professional 
Ethics. See Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 94 A.B.A. REP. 
378, 389-92 (1969). 
311. See Supplemental Report of the Board of Governors Concerning Lawyer Advertising, 102 
A.B.A. REP. 591, 607 (1977) . As amended , DR 2-105 stated: 
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist, as practicing in 
certain areas of law or as limiting his practice permitted under DR 2-101(B), 
except as follows: 
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office may use the designation "Patents," "Patent Attorney ," "Patent 
Lawyer," or "Registered Patent Attorney" or any combination of those 
terms, on his letterhead and office sign. 
(2) A lawyer who publicly discloses fields of law in which the lawyer or 
the law firm practices or states that his practice is limited to one or 
more fields of law shall do so by using the designations and definitions 
authorized and approved by [the agency having jurisdiction of the 
subject under state law] . 
(3) A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law or 
law practice by [the authority having jurisdiction under state law over 
the subject of specialization by lawyers] may hold himself out as such, 
but only in accordance with the rules prescribed by that authority . 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSffiiLITY DR 2-105 (1980) (alterations in original) . 
Among other changes, the amendment eliminated from DR 2-105(A)(1) the permissibility 
of admiralty and trademark lawyers' noting their specialties on letterheads and shingles. DR 2-
105(A)(2) was added to the rule in direct response to Bates, thus forbidding a lawyer from 
advertising any limitation in her practice without prior permission from bar regulators . 
312. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the majority in Bates explicitly limited the right to 
advertise prices for legal services to "routine legal services ." Bates, 433 U.S. at 367-68. Justice 
Powell severely criticized this view. /d. at 391-92 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting) . The 
ABA attempted to limit the effect of Bates by reading it as creating a constitutional right to 
advertise only in cases involving routine legal services . See Advertising and the Future, 63 
A.B.A. J. 1045 (1977). 
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found in Bates would be ineffective to stop most advertisements, even when 
the lawyer truly was not an expert in the advertised field, only bar-regulated 
specialization plans would protect the nonelite members of the profession from 
legal clinics. Protecting the small practitioner was an explicit justification for 
acknowledging legal specialization when, in 1979, the ABA promulgated its 
Model Plan of Specialization . 313 Proponents qf bar-regulated certification 
specialization programs argued that those programs would protect the nonelite · 
lawyer from competition from below by giving him a formally recognized 
expertise with which to attract clients. 314 When combined with certification 
as a specialist, advertising by the nonelite lawyer was no longer the degrada-
tion of the profession into a business, but the enhancement of the legal 
profession. Formal recognition of nonelite lawyers as experts distinguished 
them from lawyers at legal clinics and created a greater unity between the 
nonelite and elite specialists. 
The goals of the plan were all stated in terms that marked acceptance of 
the new understanding of lawyer professionalism: The Model Plan was an 
effort to increase public access to legal services, improve the quality of legal 
services, and maintain reasonable legal fees. 315 Advertising by lawyers 
recognized as specialists increased public access to legal services because it 
provided the prospective client important information to distinguish among the 
313. See Proceedings of the 1979AnnualMeetingofthe House of Delegates, 104A.B.A. REP. 
821, 846-47 (1979) . The ABA's reasoning was as follows : 
Those seeking specialized services now usually find them by going to large law 
firms that are known to be organized on a functionally specialized basis . . .. 
Other lawyers, including sole practitioners, small firms and young and minority 
lawyers, in general do not and cannot now obtain specialized business through 
reputation, reference or mass advertising . They are thus at a competitive disadvan-
tage-a disadvantage that can only increase in the future . They are losing ground 
rapidly to large firms and clinics. 
But what at first seems a paradox is that many lawyers are now perceiving that 
the most direct action a bar can take to protect the small practitioner is to propose and 
secure adoption of a specialization plan in the state . 
Report of the Standing Committee on Specialization, 104 A.B.A. REP. 978 , 982 (1979) ; accord 
Brink, supra note 302, at 32. Brink was the Chairman of the Standing Committee on 
Specialization when the Model Plan was adopted . The same argument, couched in profession-
alism terms , was that unfair competition also harmed members of the public, for they would have 
no objective manner in which to select appropriately qualified attorneys. See id. 
314. 
[The Model Plan] may afford better means to sole and general practitioners, on 
whom so much of our American system of delivery of legal services depends , of 
competing on a fair basis with the large law firms and specialized legal clinics and 
service groups that now dominate the market for specialized legal services. 
Report of the Standing Committee on Specialization, supra note 313, at 979 . 
315 . STANDING COMM. ON PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, HANDBOOK ON SPECIALIZATION 
9 (1983) ; see also Roderick N. Petrey, Introduction to LEGAL SPECIALIZATION, supra note 308, 
at 1. 
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offers for her business. As a specialist, however, the lawyer remained a 
independent professional because advertising, and the resulting access, was 
undertaken for the benefit of the public, not simply to make money. 316 
Certified specialists were by virtue of their certification prima facie competent 
practitioners who knew the law, at least the law in the areas in which they 
were certified. The traditional access of clients of large law firms to 
competent legal specialists was now provided to the individual in need of 
special legal services. Finally, although not empirically verified, the argument 
was that specialization offered efficiency, and thus lower prices, for the 
resolution of legal problems in our complex legal society. 
In the decade that followed, most states either studied or voted on 
specialization plans, but at the end of 1990, only fifteen states had adopted any 
plan. 317 Why? I am not certain. It is possible that because Bates offered 
nonelite members of the profession not only a reason to embrace certification, 
but an opportunity to avoid the rigors of certification, nonelite practitioners 
concluded specialization certification was unnecessary. If none lite practitio-
ners did not find themselves in competition with legal clinics, much of the 
economic and ideological incentive to support certification disappeared. A 
second reason may be that, as noted by Professor Lynn LoPucki, specialization 
plans have been "based on a theory of lawyer specialization that bears little 
relationship to the complex, de facto pattern of specialization that pervades the 
profession. "318 A third reason may be the fear by nonelite lawyers that 
certification of specialization would create hurdles that might exclude (most of) 
them from the status of "professional," a status they could continue to claim 
as long as the profession was theoretically unified by professional licen-
sure.319 
The Supreme Court's decision in Peel v. Attorney Registration and 
316. Justice Blackmun' s opinion in Bates is at odds with this statement. Blackmun wrote, 
"Since the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism, the 
historical foundation for the advertising restraint has crumbled." Bates v . State Bar, 433 U.S. 
350, 371-72 (1977). 
317. See STANDING COMM. ON SPECIALIZATION, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, STATUS REPORT ON 
STATE SPECIALIZATION PLANS (Dec. 1990). However, several states with large populations of 
attorneys, including California, Florida, and Texas, have adopted extensive specialization 
programs. See id. 
318. LYNN M. LoPuCKI, THE DE FACTO PATTERN OF LAWYER SPECIALIZATION 2 (1990) 
(footnote omitted) . 
319. This may be so in spite of the ABA's efforts to craft a model plan of certification of 
specialists in a way that limits testing requirements in favor of minimum standards of experience, 
continuing legal education requirements, and peer review. See Model Plan of Specialization, 104 
A.B.A. REP. 983, 986-87 (1979) (listing the minimum standards of specialization as twenty-five 
percent of a lawyer's full-time practice in the field for three years; ten hours per year of 
continuing legal education in the specialty; and five references from lawyers or judges) . 
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Disciplinary Commission, 320 holding that · a state may not prohibit the 
nonmisleading advertising of an attorney's certification as a specialist by an 
unapproved certification board, effectively has ended the process of bar-
controlled certification of specialists. Although the opinions321 leave open 
the possibility that some claims of certification may be considered misleading 
or may be regulated by the state through required disclaimers, the Court's 
decision negates the exclusivity of the authority of bar associations to regulate 
claims. to specialization through rules of ethics. 322 One interesting conse-
quence of Peel may be that the question whether societies of legal specialists 
will fragment the bar will finally be answered; another possible consequence 
may be the recognition of a bar already fragmented economically, culturally, 
and ideologically. 323 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The history of legal specialization is a history of the ways in which 
lawyers have viewed themselves. Two internally accepted measures of 
professionalism, knowledge and independence, have long been intertwined 
with the idea of legal specialization. For the profession to view legal 
specialization favorably, proponents of specialization needed to alter the 
profession's understanding of those two measures. Time and persistence 
allowed those advocates to succeed. Their success precipitated a new 
understanding of the lawyer's work and duty. 
Today, legal specialization is an unexceptional aspect of the profession of 
law. It is so unexceptional that assertions of specialization and concentration 
are expected of lawyers. In Victoria Stewart's case, the claim to specialization 
was so ordinary that the court could quickly conclude that her career was 
harmed when she spent two years working outside her chosen specialty. 324 
320. 496 u.s. 91 (1990) . 
321 . Peel was a 5-4 decision. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment only . 
322. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.4 (1983) (amended 1989 & 1992), 
adopted in 1983, was substantially the same as amended DR 2-105 of the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility. Like DR 2-105, it forbade lawyers from advenising a specialty other 
than patent or admiralty law except as permitted by a state cenification program. See id. As 
written, Rule 7.4 became unenforceable as a result of Peel, but it has since been amended to 
require a disclaimer whenever a lawyer advenises an unapproved cenification. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.4(c)(2) (1993) . However, the amended version may 
also be unconstitutional. 
323. See Edward 0. Laumann & John P. Heinz, Specialization and Prestige in the Legal 
Profession:TheStructureofDeference, 1977 A.B.F. RES. J. 155. Forexamplesofvariousareas 
of difference among lawyers, see generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO 
LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982) (analyzing the results of sociological 
studies of Chicago lawyers' organizational, social, and ideological values) . 
324. Stewan v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1992) . Of course, the coun was 
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There is an irony in the Stewart case that may close the circle of this 
history of legal specialization. The ftrst specialists were lawyers at large law 
firms, mainly located in New York. According to his biographer, the 
progenitor of many of those law ftrms was a lawyer named Walter S. Carter, 
known for his work with Paul D. Cravath and Charles Evans Hughes, among 
many others. ns What is not as well known is that Walter S. Carter was also 
credited by his biographer as the progenitor of the law ftrm of Jackson & 
Nash,326 the same Jackson & Nash that Victoria Stewart alleged damaged her 
career as a specialist in environmental law. · 
assuming, for purposes of the appeal, that Stewart's allegations were true. 
325 . See KOEGEL, supra note 20, at 1-12. 
326. See id. at app. Vlll . 
